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ABSTRACT 
 
An Empirical Analysis of 
Book-Tax Reporting Difference and 
Tax Noncompliance Behavior in China 
 
by 
 
TANG Feng 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 The traditional accounting system in China was directly linked to the tax 
assessment. The close linkage between the two sets of reporting rules has 
substantially weakened, as China promulgated a series of accounting standards and 
regulations in the late 1990s. As a result, accounting for financial reporting purposes 
does not have to conform to accounting for tax reporting purposes. This divergence 
between the two measures of income will inevitably cause accounting book income 
to differ from taxable income. This is because the more the excess of book income 
over taxable income, the more the magnitude of tax audit adjustments. Mills (1998) 
suggests that book tax difference is an indicator of a firm’s tax noncompliance. This 
implies that additional tax-related costs may arise when accounting book income is 
higher than taxable income, and these costs may have an impact on the tradeoff 
between tax incentives and financial reporting incentives. 
 
Based on data from the Chinese stock market, this study tests empirically 
whether book tax differences due to the tradeoff between tax and non-tax cost results 
in tax audit adjustments. I hypothesize that the magnitude of tax noncompliance 
increases as book tax differences increase, and this relationship is stronger after the 
departure of financial reporting from tax rules in China. The results provide evidence 
in support of the hypothesis. This study extends prior research and contributes to the 
understanding of tax and non-tax tradeoffs in a different context. The results have 
rich implications for corporate managers and policymakers in other developing 
countries experiencing a similar transition from a tax-based accounting system to a 
system that gives corporate managers considerable discretion over the choice of 
accounting methods. One implication is that although book tax delinking may 
improve the usefulness of financial reports, it could weaken the perceived equity of 
the tax system and increase corporate tax avoidance behavior. Therefore, when 
setting accounting standards, policy makers should not only look at the impact of 
information relevance on the capital market, but also consider the consequence of 
these standards on government revenue. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter summarizes the motivation of this study, research objective and 
main findings. Theoretical contributions and practical implications are also discussed 
at large. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
With the rapid economic development of China and its entry into the World 
Trade Organization, China’s accounting and tax regulations have gone through great 
revisions in the last few years. Traditional accounting systems in China have been 
criticized as being incapable of reflecting the truth and fairness of a financial 
situation, and tax-oriented accounting rules have been regarded as a major barrier 
impeding accounting harmonization with international accounting practices (Gao, 
2001; Liu, 2001; Gao, 2003). Since the late 1990s, a series of accounting standards 
and new accounting systems have been promulgated, and as a result, the close link 
between accounting and tax has been gradually removed. In particular, the new 
comprehensive Accounting System for Business Enterprises issued on December 29, 
2000 has led to substantive separation of accounting and tax treatments, and thus, 
accounting for financial reporting purposes does not necessarily have to conform to 
accounting for tax reporting purposes. This divergence of accounting and tax rules 
generally causes accounting book income to differ from taxable income. 
 Mills (1998) suggests that book tax difference (i.e., the difference between 
book income and taxable income) is an indication of tax noncompliance, and the 
more the excess of book income over taxable income, the more the magnitude of tax 
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audit adjustments. This implies that additional tax-related costs may arise when 
accounting income is higher than taxable income, and that these additional costs have 
an impact on the tradeoff between tax incentives and financial reporting incentives. 
Therefore, it would be most interesting to examine the relationship between book tax 
difference and tax noncompliance in China’s specific situations. 
Tax noncompliance behavior is attracting the interest of increasing numbers 
of researchers, and has become a booming research area in accounting. As 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) summarize, three areas in tax research – tax and 
non-tax cost tradeoffs, taxes and asset prices, and multijurisdictional, have been 
emerging in recent years. Most empirical studies focus on the tax and non-tax cost 
tradeoffs, especially the tradeoff between tax incentives and financial reporting 
considerations (Cloyd et al., 1996; Mills, 1996, 1998; Mills and Newberry, 2001). 
Other studies examine the factors that affect tax noncompliance behavior (e.g., Rice, 
1992; Bradley, 1994). However, most of this line of research was carried out based 
on data from developed economies, especially the US. Research on tax 
noncompliance behavior in developing economies is limited. While Chan and Mo 
(2000, 2002) study how tax holiday positions and corporate characteristics are 
associated with tax noncompliance of foreign investment enterprises in China, they 
have not directly examined the impact of book tax differences originating from the 
tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs on tax noncompliance behavior in China. 
 
1.2 Research Objective 
 As significant reforms of accounting and tax rules have occurred in China 
since the late 1990s, the objective of the study is to investigate whether book tax 
differences arising from the separation of accounting and tax regulations lead to tax 
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noncompliance by listed companies in China. Specifically, this study attempts to test 
empirically whether book tax differences due to the tradeoff management makes 
between tax and non-tax costs result in tax audit adjustments on the companies listed 
in China’s capital markets, and whether the relationship differs in the periods of pre- 
vs. post-delinking of book tax reporting rules. I hypothesize that the magnitude of tax 
noncompliance will increase as book tax difference increases, especially after 2001 
when financial reporting was detached from tax reporting. Following Chan and Mo 
(2002), I use the amount of tax audit adjustments required by tax authorities to proxy 
for the magnitude of tax noncompliance. Data used for the study were collected from 
companies’ annual reports, prospectuses, announcements, and other publicized 
documents, as well as tax returns from tax authorities and CPA firms. 
 
1.3 Main findings 
Based on 2,207 firm-year observations during the period 1998-2003, the 
regression results suggest that book tax difference and tax audit adjustment are 
positively related. Moreover, this relationship is significantly stronger after 2001 
than before. I estimate that as book tax difference increases by one unit, tax audit 
adjustment will be greater during the post- than the pre-delinking period to the extent 
of 0.05% of sales revenue. This implies that while it may facilitate business decision-
making and is more consistent with the “true and fair” view concept, book tax 
separation may reduce tax compliance levels and increase tax audit costs. 
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1.4 Significance of the study 
1.4.1 Theoretical contributions 
 This research extends Mills’ (1998) study to the Chinese context, which is 
dramatically different from that in the US, and the empirical evidence obtained 
contributes to the prior literature in the following three aspects. First, the results 
suggest that book tax difference leads to tax audit adjustment by the Chinese tax 
authorities, which confirms that book tax difference is a useful indicator of tax 
noncompliance behavior in China when substantial book tax separation occurs. That 
is, in the context of China, the magnitude of book tax difference, resulting from 
corporate managers’ decisions on the choice of financial accounting and tax 
treatments, may also incur tax authorities’ increased scrutiny of corporate tax 
reporting. Second, based on the tax and non-tax costs tradeoff theory developed in 
the literature, I argue that tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs operated differently before 
book tax separation in China compared with the tradeoffs in the US, and that they 
become somewhat similar after book tax delinking in both countries. In other words, 
the application of tax and non-tax costs tradeoff theory is applicable in China with 
some necessary modification. That is, before book tax separation, managers simply 
trade off the relative importance of financial reporting and tax reporting without 
considering additional tax-related costs, while after book tax separation, additional 
tax-related costs (such as tax examination costs and tax fines) originating from book 
tax difference should be taken into account. Finally, the empirical evidence 
contributes to the Scholes-Wolfson framework which attempts to explain the role of 
taxes in organizations (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992; Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). 
That is, to some extent, tax does have an impact on Chinese managers’ financial 
decisions. Managers should consider “all parties”, “all taxes”, and “all costs” to 
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achieve effective tax planning, and tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs affect managers’ 
choice of financial and tax reporting treatments. Therefore, for researchers interested 
in studying tax noncompliance in transitional economies such as China, all tax and 
non-tax related factors should be included in the analysis. Omitting otherwise 
relevant variables could confound the test results. 
1.3.2 Practical implications 
The results of the study are rich in implications. From the perspective of 
corporate managers, the results suggest that while the separation of book tax 
regulations may provide opportunities for tax planning and earnings management, 
firms cannot costlessly manipulate book income and taxable income independently 
without incurring probable tax examination costs. From the perspective of 
accounting and tax policy makers, the results suggest that while the detachment of 
the two sets of rules may improve the usefulness of financial reports, it could weaken 
the perceived equity of the tax system and increase the tax noncompliance level, as 
the tax authorities have to put great efforts into detecting potential tax violations by 
carrying out in-depth tax audits. Therefore, when policy makers set financial 
accounting standards, they should not only look at the impact of the true and fair 
view concept on the capital market, but also consider the effect of these standards on 
tax revenue forfeited due to noncompliance. 
Moreover, the results of this study may be irradiative for other countries. 
Relationships between accounting and tax systems tend to vary among countries. 
Generally, there are three types of book tax systems around the world (OECD, 1987; 
Porcano & Tran, 1998; Eberhartinger, 1999; Lamb, Nobes, and Roberts, 1998; Haller, 
1992; Takatera and Daigo, 1989; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000). In the first, 
accounting rules are significantly affected by tax rules. No book entries contrary to 
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tax rules are allowed in financial reporting. Typical countries using the tax-based 
accounting system include Brazil, India, Mexico, Norway, Japan, and Russia.1 In 
these countries, the major users of financial reports are government agencies and 
financial institutions. As the objective of financial reporting is to provide information 
to these homogeneous groups of users, uniform financial reports conforming to tax 
reporting are adequate to serve the purpose. As such, accounting rules and tax rules 
conform in all aspects. Although there may be less tax noncompliance, tax-oriented 
financial accounting information may not truly reflect the financial position and 
operating results of the companies. Hence, Porcano and Tran (1998) suggest that a 
certain degree of separation of the two rules may be beneficial. In the second, 
accounting rules are independent of tax rules. That is, financial reporting is based on 
accounting rules, while tax reporting is based on an independent framework outside 
financial accounting principles. Countries adopting this type of system include 
Australia, Canada, Demark, Ireland, Netherlands, and New Zealand, the UK, and the 
US. As pointed out by Mills (1996), government enforcement costs are high when 
tax rules and accounting rules are not closely related. Further, preparing financial 
reports and tax reports separately may not be cost effective both for individual 
taxpayers and for the society. Since conformity of accounting and tax rules may 
improve the perceived equity of the tax system, reduce tax compliance costs, and 
enhance tax compliance levels, there has been a call for a reasonable book-tax 
alignment in these countries (Porcano and Tran, 1998). 
 In the third, financial accounting is based on generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), with some exceptions to meet specific tax purposes. Tax 
reporting, to some extent, depends on financial reporting. They are relevant to each 
                                                 
1 In fact, reforms have recently occurred in all these countries except Brazil, leading to some degree of 
separation between accounting and tax rules (Alexander and Schwencke, 1997; Takatera and Daigo, 
1989; Rahman et al., 2004; Motorin, 2000). 
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other, but not strictly in conformity. Countries using this type of system include 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and 
Sweden. While the main users of financial information in the first category tend to be 
the government, the major users in the second and third categories are more 
diversified and include investors, bankers, creditors, and the public. In order to 
satisfy the needs of these heterogenous groups of users, accounting for financial 
reporting and accounting for tax reporting cannot be in conformity for all business 
transactions. While financial reporting is independent of tax reporting in the second 
category, the two systems are interdependent in the third category. In countries in the 
last category, accounting rules and tax rules are not the same under certain 
circumstances, in order to achieve accounting harmonization with international 
practice and to fulfill the differential objectives of the two systems simultaneously. 
As China can also be classified, respectively, into the first and the last category pre- 
and post-2000, its experience can provide a useful reference for other countries 
undergoing similar transitions, especially for major developing countries, such as 
India, Brazil, and Mexico. 
 
1.5 Organization of the thesis 
The organization of the remaining chapters is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews 
the prior literature on tax noncompliance and discusses the tax and non-tax costs 
tradeoff theory. Chapter 3 provides the institutional background on the development 
of China’s accounting and tax regulations. Chapter 4 develops the research 
hypothesis. Chapter 5 describes the research methods, including data collection, 
sample selection, and the regression model. Chapter 6 presents empirical results. 
Chapter 7 concludes, and discusses some limitations and further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
 Research in taxation is becoming an increasingly important area of research 
in accounting. This chapter reviews in detail studies on tax noncompliance and tax 
non-tax costs tradeoff theory in developed countries, and limited studies on tax 
noncompliance in China. 
 
2.1 Studies on tax noncompliance in developed economies 
 Due to the difficulty of data collection, there are not many studies on 
corporate tax noncompliance behavior. Some studies have attempted to find the 
organizational factors that affect tax noncompliance behavior. As commented by 
MacKie-Mason (1992), Rice (1992) may be the first to have empirically examined 
corporate tax evasion behavior. Rice (1992) examines small corporations’ tax 
noncompliance behavior, and finds that while public information disclosure 
requirements encourage tax compliance, marginal tax rates, firm size, and location in 
a poor compliance region have a negative association with tax compliance. Bradley 
(1994) examines the influence on tax compliance behavior of six factors – 
complexity of tax law, supportive corporate environment, financial stress, perceived 
costs of noncompliance, risk of audit adjustment, and personal compliance profile of 
the corporate tax employee. She was the first to develop a set of scales to measure 
these six potential factors. Murray (1995) focuses on sales tax compliance, and finds 
that firm size affects tax noncompliance, that is, newer firms are more tax compliant 
than older firms. 
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 The majority of previous studies on tax noncompliance are based on the tax 
and non-tax costs tradeoff theory, especially the tradeoff between tax related costs 
and financial reporting cost. As Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) summarize, the tax 
and non-tax costs tradeoff has been one of the major areas of tax research in 
accounting. Selected papers are reviewed in the following section. 
 
2.2 Studies on tax and non-tax costs tradeoff 
 Tax and non-tax costs tradeoff theory originates from the framework 
proposed by Scholes and Wolfson (1992), who attempt to investigate the role of 
taxes in organizations by adopting a positive perspective. The Scholes-Wolfson 
conceptual framework involves three central aspects, that is, all parties, all taxes and 
all costs. Scholes and Wolfson state: 
 “Effective tax planning requires the planner to consider the tax implications of a 
proposed transaction for all of the parties to the transaction.” 
“Effective tax planning requires the planner, in making investment and financing 
decisions, to consider not only explicit taxes (tax dollars paid directly to taxing authorities) 
but also implicit taxes (taxes that are paid indirectly in the form of lower before-tax rates of 
return on tax-favored investments.” 
 “Effective tax planning requires the planner to recognize that taxes represent only 
one among many business costs, and all costs must be considered in the planning process: to 
be implemented, some proposed tax plans may require exceedingly costly restructuring of 
the business.” (Page 2) 
The Scholes-Wolfson paradigm implies that managers should consider “all 
parties”, “all taxes”, and “all costs” to achieve the goals of effective tax planning, 
such as tax minimization. Minimizing the present value of tax-related costs should be 
traded off with or weighed against other objectives, such as maximizing reported 
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accounting income and the wealth of shareholders. Based on this framework, a 
number of empirical studies have examined tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs, 
particularly the tradeoff between financial reporting costs and tax costs in the US. 
For example, Mills (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (1994) examine the aggregate effects 
of the tradeoff and the tradeoff in specific settings, such as LIFO inventory 
accounting treatment and income shifting around the US tax reform in 1986. 
Financial reporting costs, extensively addressed in earnings management literature 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, 1990; Healy and Wahlen, 1999), are those real or 
perceived costs related to decreases in reported accounting income or shareholders’ 
equity (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). In many cases, tax planning will lead to 
lower reported accounting income. Rational managers, attempting to realize the 
objectives of effective tax planning, will evaluate the relative importance of tax 
incentives and financial reporting incentives to maximize the expected benefits for 
themselves and for the whole firm, as financial contracts (e.g., compensation plan 
and debt contract) are often tied up with accounting income, and firms’ market value 
is closely related to accounting numbers (Ball and Brown, 1968; Dechow, 1994; 
Kothari, 2001; Nichols and Wahlen, 2004). As such, tax and non-tax costs tradeoff 
can be used to investigate corporate tax noncompliance behavior. 
 Cloyd (1995) uses an experimental design, in which experienced tax 
professionals responded to questions on two hypothetical scenarios. He finds that 
when accounting treatment and tax treatment are ambiguous, tax preparers tradeoff 
tax benefits against non-tax costs in the process of choosing methods for financial 
accounting and tax reporting, as book tax conformity or nonconformity can have 
influences on tax and non-tax costs or benefits. Specifically, when accounting and 
tax treatment are not in conformity, tax preparers predict that the probability of being 
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tax audited by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is higher and the probability of 
successfully defending aggressive tax positions is lower; and it is the opposite case 
when accounting and tax treatment are in conformity. Similarly, Cloyd et al. (1996) 
use a mail survey to ask senior financial officers of selected large- and medium-sized 
manufacturing companies to respond to questions in a short case. They also find that 
tax reporting considerations have impacts on financial accounting choice, because 
book-tax conformity decreases the probability of the IRS’s audit and scrutiny. From 
the perspective of tax authorities, book tax difference is a “red flag” of aggressive tax 
reporting. Moreover, public firms are less aggressive in tax noncompliance than 
private firms, because of the higher non-tax costs they face.  
Mills (1996) provides preliminary evidence that tax audit adjustments by the 
IRS are related to the level of book tax conformity, which is also related to the 
tradeoff between incentives of financial reporting and tax reporting. She also finds 
some evidence that public firms generally have larger book tax differences than 
private firms, supporting the hypothesis that public firms have stronger book 
incentives relative to tax incentives than private firms. Using archival data, Mills 
(1998) finds that the proposed audit adjustments by the IRS will be greater as book-
tax differences increase, indicating that corporate managers cannot costlessly 
manipulate financial accounting reporting and tax reporting independently, as there 
exist tradeoffs between current tax savings, costs of tax examination and financial 
reporting benefits. The empirical results also suggest that public firms generally have 
lower IRS proposed audit adjustments than private firms, because public firms face 
more non-tax costs and thus are less aggressive in tax planning, The findings 
triangulate the conclusions of Cloyd (1995) and Cloyd et al. (1996). 
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Mills and Sansing (2000) attempt to formulate tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs 
by constructing a stylized game theory tax compliance model. Their model considers 
both taxpayers and the tax authority as strategic players, and predicts that book tax 
difference is highly correlated with the chance of tax audit by the tax authority, but is 
not related to detected understatements of tax liability. Specifically, they propose that 
the probability of being tax audited increases as positive book tax difference 
increases, and that the probability of additional tax costs incurred, conditional on 
being audited, is similar, regardless of whether positive book tax difference is 
generated or not. The strategic tax compliance model is empirically tested in the 
study, and the results validate the model. Mills and Newberry (2001) also examine 
tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs by public vs. private firms, and find evidence of the 
effect of tax and non-tax costs on aggregate book tax reporting difference. Their 
results also confirm that public firms generally report larger book tax difference than 
private firms, due to higher financial reporting costs and thus fewer incentives for 
conforming financial reporting to tax reporting. This implies that book tax difference 
may be a stronger indicator of aggressive tax reporting for public firms than for 
private firms. 
 In addition to these studies testing aggregate and general effects of tax and 
non-tax tradeoffs on tax noncompliance behavior, other research focuses on a 
number of specific settings, such as LIFO (Last In First Out) inventory accounting 
treatment (Dhaliwal et al., 1994; Frankel, and Trezevant, 1994; Hunt et al., 1996), 
management compensation (Matsunaga et al., 1992), capital structure and divestiture 
(Maydew et al., 1999; Klassen, 1997), income shifting corresponding to the US Tax 
Reform Act in 1986 (Scholes et al., 1992; Dhaliwal and Wang, 1992; Guenther, 1994; 
Guenther et al., 1997; Maydew, 1997) and specific regulated industries (Scholes et 
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al., 1990; Beatty et al., 1995; Beatty and Harris, 1999; Mikhail, 1999). All these 
studies directly or indirectly suggest that tax and non-tax tradeoffs are related to tax 
noncompliance behavior. For example, Guenther et al. (1997) provide evidence that 
public firms which were required to switch from the cash method to the accrual 
method for tax reporting purposes as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 deferred 
income to later years at a lower tax rate. They argue that this behavior is consistent 
with the tax and non-tax costs tradeoff arising from the tax reform. Beatty and Harris 
(1999) and Mikhail (1999) examine banks and life insurance companies, and find 
that tax considerations have a greater influence on private firms than on public firms. 
The results suggest that private firms view tax savings as more important than 
financial reporting benefits, and achieving optimal tax strategy is less costly for 
private firms. Using a sample of major capital divestitures (i.e., large dispositions of 
operating units), Klassen (1997) provides evidence that inside ownership 
concentration has impacts on the tradeoff between book and tax incentives. He finds 
that the financial reporting consequences of tax planning strategies are less important 
where firm ownership is concentrated in the hands of relatively few owners, and thus 
manager-owned companies tend to put a higher priority on tax planning, because 
they are less sensitive to financial reporting costs. 
 
2.3 Studies on tax noncompliance in developing economies 
 Although there is an increasing number of empirical studies in the developed 
economy framework, particularly the US, studies on tax noncompliance behavior in 
China are limited. The exception to this is the study by Chan and Mo (2000). By 
obtaining tax audit data from selected Chinese tax bureau, they measure tax 
noncompliance as tax audit adjustments required by the tax authorities, and find 
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empirical evidence to suggest that tax noncompliance behavior of foreign investment 
enterprises is significantly affected by their tax holiday positions. Specifically, they 
find that companies’ least compliant behavior occurs in the pre-holiday periods, 
while their most compliant behavior occurs in the tax-exemption period. They also 
find that companies have long-term considerations on tax noncompliance strategy, 
and that some firm characteristics, such as activity orientation, technology status, 
form of investment and inside ownership concentration, influence noncompliance. 
Chan and Mo (2002) extend their previous study of 2000 by decomposing tax audit 
adjustments into book-tax conforming adjustments and book-tax difference 
adjustments to investigate the impact of firm characteristics on tax noncompliance. 
Book-tax conforming tax audit adjustments represent those adjustments that affect 
both accounting income and taxable income, while book-tax difference tax audit 
adjustments represent those adjustments that affect only taxable income. The 
decomposition is a useful starting point to study different incentives and forms of 
noncompliance and helps better analyze tax noncompliance behavior. Chan and Mo 
(2002) find that firm characteristics have a significant impact on book-tax 
conforming adjustments and book-tax difference adjustments. Specifically, they find 
that export-oriented and high-tech foreign investment enterprises generally have 
larger book-tax conforming noncompliance, while domestic-oriented and non-high-
tech foreign investment enterprises have larger book-tax difference noncompliance. 
These results also reflect tax and non-tax tradeoffs faced by corporate managers 
when they try to achieve a certain business goal. 
 In summary, tax noncompliance has been an important research area in the 
last two decades. While the majority of studies conducted in the US examine how 
organizational factors and tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs influence tax 
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noncompliance, few studies have been carried out in China. This study contributes to 
the literature by investigating the effect of tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs on tax 
noncompliance in a transitional economy framework. The specific situations 
concerning the evolution of accounting and tax rules are described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Institutional Background 
 
 This chapter describes the specific situations concerning the evolution of 
accounting and tax rules in China, including the periods of book tax conformity and 
book tax separation. Differential interactions of accounting and tax rules in China 
and the US are also discussed. 
 
3.1 The interaction of accounting and tax rules in China 
3.1.1 Book tax conformity 
The traditional accounting system in China was directly linked to the fiscal 
budget and tax assessment. Before 1978, China adopted the fiscal policy of “unified 
receipts and allocations by the state”. That is, profits earned by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were handed over to the state; their losses incurred were covered 
by the state; and the funds they needed were allocated by the state. There were no 
personal or enterprise income taxes, and thus no tax policy. Accounting simply 
facilitates fiscal policy to fulfill its budgetary resource allocation function. In 1979, 
the government introduced the profit retention system, under which SOEs were 
allowed to retain a portion of their profit. The chief objective of this reform was to 
provide incentives for enterprises to increase production and profits. However, the 
profit retention rate was highly discretionary and differentiated, as it was based on ad 
hoc, one-to-one negotiations between the enterprise and the government. In July 
1983, the profit retention system was replaced by a tax remittance system in which 
all SOEs paid standard income taxes according to the tax law. Tax laws have since 
 17 
played a significant role in financial reporting. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
determines the tax rules, which in turn dictate accounting rules. Financial statements 
and tax returns must conform in all respects for domestic enterprises. Consequently, 
accounting income did not differ significantly from taxable income.2 
In the early 1990s, significant revisions were made to China’s accounting and 
tax regulations. For tax rules, the Income Tax Law for Foreign Investment 
Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises was implemented in 1991, while the Enterprise 
Income Tax Law (EIT) for domestic enterprises became effective in 1994. For 
accounting regulations, the MOF promulgated Accounting Regulations for 
Experimental Listed Companies in 1992 and “Two Standards and Two Systems” in 
1993.3 These rules transformed the old accounting process tailored to the centrally 
planned economy to the new one in accordance with the market economy. This was 
the first attempt by the government to realize harmonization of China’s accounting 
rules with international accounting practices (Liu and Zhang, 1996; Gao, 2001; Chen, 
Sun, and Wang, 2002; Gao, 2003). For instance, six financial accounting elements – 
asset, liability, equity, revenue, expense and earnings were defined for the first time, 
a debit and credit double-entry bookkeeping system was adopted, and the outdated 
financial statements were replaced by a commonly recognized balance sheet and 
income statements. However, although some accounting and tax reforms have taken 
place during this period, accounting treatment should still conform to tax rules in 
most respects. 
                                                 
2 Although the MOF allows foreign investment enterprises to prepare their financial statements based 
on international practices, the financial statements, even though they are drawn up in line with 
international standards, are still considerably influenced by the tax rules (Liu and Zhang, 1996; Gao, 
2001; Gao, 2003). For example, the Income Tax Law for Joint Ventures states that, where accounting 
treatment adopted by the business contradicts tax regulation, tax rules prevail over general accounting 
principles. 
 
3 ‘Two Standards’ refers to Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises – Basic Standard and 
Enterprise Financial General Standards. ‘Two Systems’ refers to Enterprise Financial and 
Accounting Systems. 
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3.1.2 Book tax separation 
Since the late 1990s, the close relationship between financial accounting and 
accounting for tax purposes has been criticized by both academics and business 
communities. The major criticism is that tax oriented financial reporting distorts both 
the business decisions and “true and fair view” concept, and tax-driven accounting 
standards are regarded as one of the major reasons for accounting disharmony with 
internationally accepted practice (Liu, 2001; Gao, 2001; Gao, 2003). For example, 
tax law stipulates that bad debt provisions should not exceed 0.3-0.5% of the ending 
balances of accounts receivable. While the intent of this regulation is to prevent 
companies from overstating expenses to reduce tax payments, it is likely that in fact 
over 0.5% of accounts receivable may become uncollectible. If financial accounting 
should conform to tax accounting, the presentation of financial statements for 
external reporting may be distorted. Another example is the rules concerning 
depreciation of capital assets. The tax law stipulates that the straight-line method 
should be used except in some special cases, and specifies a minimum useful life for 
different categories of capital assets. This regulation may also be incompatible with 
the true and fair view, since the depreciation methods and the economic life of the 
asset are not determined by the business according to its underlying business 
conditions for the purposes of external reporting. A third instance is revenue 
recognition. The tax law generally does not consider the risks related to revenue 
realization. Ignoring risk factors may harm the decision usefulness of financial 
accounting information, because users need relevant information not only on 
expected returns, but also on potential risks. 
In addition, critics argue that accounting rules should be independent of tax 
rules because the objectives of the two sets of rules are quite different. While the 
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primary objective of a tax system is to raise revenue for government programs, the 
objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide information useful to 
users for making and evaluating decisions about the use of firm resources. Since the 
role of tax rules is revenue raising, it is reasonable to expect that certain provisions of 
the tax law are designed to increase revenue and decrease deductions, which differs 
from accounting rules. While financial reporting should reflect a number of 
qualitative characteristics, such as relevance, reliability, comparability, and 
consistency (SFAC No.2, 1980), the tax system should be equitable, efficient 
(neutral), certain, and economical (Porcano and Tran, 1998). Whereas a certain 
degree of flexibility may be allowed in financial reporting, uniformity is necessary 
for tax reporting (Eberhartinger, 1999). Therefore, critics argue that accounting for 
financial reporting and accounting for tax reporting should be delinked, to fulfill their 
respective objectives and to satisfy their respective information qualities. 
In light of domestic and international pressures, on January 1 1998, China 
revised the Accounting Systems for Listed Companies, in an effort to relax the tax 
oriented accounting principle, including the removal of rigid limits on bad debt 
provisions and inventory and temporary investment valuation. In late 2000, the MOF 
further revised the accounting system, and required shareholding companies to 
comply with the new Accounting System for Business Enterprises effective on 
January 1, 2001.4 The new accounting standards and system were designed to move 
away from the close link between financial reporting and tax reporting.5  One of the 
most significant changes was that listed companies are allowed to determine, based 
                                                 
4 The new Accounting System for Business Enterprises differs from the Enterprise Financial and 
Accounting Systems effective in 1993, in that while the old systems differentiated enterprises in terms 
of industry, the new system unified accounting treatments for all enterprises in different industries 
except financial institutions. 
 
5 Refer to Appendix I for a list of China’s accounting standards and systems issued by 2003. 
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on their specific situations, the amounts of eight free-choice provisions, including 
bad debt provision, provision on impairment of inventories, current investments, 
long-term investments, fixed assets, construction in process, intangible assets, and 
consigned loans. These provisions can be charged into corresponding costs, expenses 
or losses accounts for financial reporting purposes, but they are not deductible from 
taxable income. Thus, large book tax differences may be generated. While this 
improves greatly the information quality of financial accounting, the accounting 
reform leads to more items of differential treatments for financial reporting and tax 
reporting. With regard to tax regulations, the State Administration of Taxation issued 
Measures on Enterprise Income Tax Pretax Deductions on May 16, 2000, which 
specifies items deductible from taxable income. A number of supplementary 
documents were subsequently published in 2003 to clarify ambiguous areas of tax 
treatment which differ from accounting rules. The new system, together with sixteen 
specific accounting standards, has caused accounting regulations to substantially 
depart from tax regulations since 2001.6 
Appendix III describes the major divergence of the two sets of rules. This 
divergence can be grouped into the following five categories: 1) differences in the 
timing of recognition of sales and cost of sales; 2) differences in the method of 
determining bad debt, management fees, R&D expenses, and entertainment expenses; 
3) differences in treating certain operating expenses, such as advertising expenses, 
commission and insurance expenses, etc.; 4) differences in handling finance 
expenditures relating to the cost of debt; and 5) differences in the treatment of non-
operating expenses such as donations, tax late-payment surcharges and penalties, loss 
arising from debt restructuring, etc. Under these circumstances, accounting income 
                                                 
6 Refer to Appendix II for the flowchart of significant reforms of accounting and tax rules in China 
since the early 1990s. 
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prepared under China’s GAAP is expected to be different from taxable income 
prepared under the tax regulations, and companies are allowed to make any entries in 
their books of account that are contrary to the tax rules. Companies are required to 
strictly comply with the new accounting system when recognizing revenue, costs, 
expenses and losses, and preparing financial accounting statements. When filing tax 
returns, companies need not change book-keeping documents, but instead adjust tax 
returns only, if accounting income and taxable income are not in conformity due to 
differences on the bases and timing of income recognition and calculation. 
The departure of accounting regulations from tax regulations will inevitably 
cause book income to differ significantly from taxable income. Although the 
departure of the two accounting schemes may have increased harmonization with 
international norms, the flight-from-tax financial accounting rules may also have 
provided management with opportunities to manipulate both book income and 
taxable income, and have as a result increased difficulties for tax authorities in tax 
collection and investigation. 
 
3.2 Comparison of book tax interaction in China and the US  
 In the US, financial accounting rules and tax rules are generally regarded as 
two separate systems with little conformity. An examination of the historical 
development of these two rules in the US reveals that book tax conformity existed 
prior to the 1950s, and the two sets of rules separated gradually over time (Porcano 
and Tran, 1998). At first, tax rules were fundamentally dependent on accounting 
rules. Taxable income was determined in accordance with GAAP, and was calculated 
based on books of account. The alignment of book tax regulations was designed to 
ensure that proper accounting methods were used to clearly reflect income. However, 
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since the 1960s, the extent of reliance of tax reporting on accounting rules began to 
decrease, because of the divergent objectives of the accounting and tax systems. 
According to the current Internal Revenue Code (IRC), tax rules do not conform to 
accounting rules in most aspects, except in the case of inventory valuation (Lamb, 
Nobes, and Roberts, 1998). That is, if the LIFO method is used for tax reporting 
purposes, it should also be used for financial reporting (Mills, 1998). There are also 
some minor areas where book tax conformity exists, such as fixed asset valuation 
and research and development expenditure (Lamb, Nobes, and Roberts, 1998). 
 As described above, book income was detached from taxable income during 
the late 1990s in China. Although there are quite a number of items, stipulated in 
accounting and tax regulations, where financial accounting treatments and tax 
treatments are not the same, determination of taxable income is still based on 
accounting income. Taxable income is calculated by starting from book income and 
making some adjustments to reach the final amount. The two sets of rules are not 
separate in China to the same extent as in the US. As mentioned in Chapter 1, China 
belongs to the third type of relationship between accounting and tax regulations, 
whereas the US falls into the second type of relationship. Therefore, the book tax 
interaction in China is not the same as that in the US. Due to independence of 
accounting and tax rules in the US and interdependence of the two systems in China, 
tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs may differ.  This difference may result in a differential 
relationship between book tax difference and tax noncompliance behavior in these 
two countries. 
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Chapter 4 
Hypothesis Development 
 
As mentioned above, there have been increasing studies on tax 
noncompliance in developed countries, especially in the US, and theories and 
hypotheses in this line of research are well developed and empirically tested. 
However, few studies focus on tax noncompliance behavior in developing economies. 
Although no country can be immune to tax noncompliance, there is, however, a 
likelihood that more tax abuses are encountered in developing countries than in 
developed countries, as developing countries generally lack infrastructure and 
experience in tax administration. Further, the separation of accounting and tax 
regulations in China provides a unique opportunity to study the relationship between 
book tax difference and tax noncompliance. In this chapter, I develop the hypothesis 
about the impact of book tax differences arising from the separation of the two sets 
of rules on tax noncompliance by using relevant conclusions drawn from the 
experience in the US and also considering China’s unique institutional background. 
 
4.1 Relationship between book tax difference and tax noncompliance 
      during the period 1998-2000 
Prior research conducted in the US indicates that tax noncompliance behavior 
is affected by corporate managers’ tax and non-tax considerations. Mills (1998) 
argues that book tax differences represent aggressive tax reporting of the firm, and 
thus the more book income exceeds taxable income, the greater are the proposed 
audit adjustments by the tax authorities. While this relation between book tax 
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difference and tax audit adjustments may be evident in the US, where the accounting 
rules are independent of tax rules, it may not be applicable to the Chinese context 
prior to 2001 when accounting and tax regulations were largely aligned. Before 2001, 
financial accounting treatments and tax treatments conformed in most aspects, and 
thus there were few instances where accounting income differed from taxable income. 
In such a context, book tax differences may not be an effective signal of tax 
noncompliance behavior. Specifically, if corporate managers lower taxable income, 
book income will also be lowered by a similar amount, and vice versa. There is 
limited room for management to manipulate book income and taxable income 
separately and simultaneously to achieve certain business goals. Therefore, book tax 
difference may not be correlated to tax audit adjustments in this circumstance. 
 
4.2 Relationship between book tax difference and tax noncompliance 
      during the period 2001-2003 
As described earlier, China has undergone major reforms in its accounting 
and tax systems since the late 1990s. Particularly in 2001, a series of accounting 
regulations were promulgated and implemented. Appendix II lists a number of 
accounting rules which were put into effect in 2001. These new regulations directly 
or indirectly cause financial accounting to depart from tax accounting.  In particular, 
the issuance of the Accounting System for Business Enterprises effective on 1 
January 2001 can be seen as a milestone of substantial book tax separation. 
Appendix III describes the major items for which the accounting treatments 
stipulated in the new accounting system differ from those stipulated in the tax laws. 
This separation of accounting and tax rules gives managers some leeway to 
manipulate book income and taxable income separately, and inevitably results in 
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large book tax differences. Managers can make income-increasing/decreasing 
accounting changes through bad debt provisions, depreciation estimates, and other 
discretionary accruals. For example, Chen et al. (2000) find that listed Chinese 
companies use discretionary accruals to manage earnings to a level required for 
maintaining listing status and raising additional capital through rights issue. 
Furthermore, book tax separation produces flexibility not only for financial reporting, 
but also for tax reporting, because there are more adjusting items in the tax returns 
which can be employed by managers to manipulate taxable income. As a result, it is 
possible that managers can manipulate book income and taxable income in a 
nonconforming way. That is, managers can choose one treatment for tax reporting 
and another one for financial accounting reporting. For example, when the straight-
line depreciation method is required for tax reporting and minimum useful life of the 
asset is stipulated in the tax regulation, managers can adopt other depreciation 
methods, such as double-declining balance method and sum-of-the-years-digits 
method for financial reporting, and determine expected useful life based on the 
specific situation. Another example is that managers can choose difference inventory 
methods for accounting and tax purposes. Thus, book income and taxable income 
differ in such contexts. 
However, tax and non-tax costs tradeoff theory implies that managers cannot 
costlessly overstate accounting income and understate taxable income independently. 
This tradeoff theory suggests that rational corporate managers should attempt to 
maximize the expected utility of known current tax payments, probable future extra 
tax costs, and other non-tax costs such as financial reporting costs.7  In the simplest 
situation, that is, without probable extra tax costs and other non-tax costs, corporate 
                                                 
7 As pointed out by Mills and Newberry (2001), some firms that face significant non-tax financial 
reporting costs still report small book-tax differences. Such irrational behavior is difficult to predict 
and test empirically. 
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managers have the incentive to report as low taxable income as possible, even zero 
taxable income, to minimize tax payments, and to report as high book income as 
possible to maximize financial reporting benefits. In a realistic complex situation, a 
firm faces two kinds of costs. The first one is the probable extra tax costs, such as tax 
examination costs and tax fines. On one hand, when taxable income is held constant, 
increasing book income will result in larger book tax differences. However, as both 
book income and taxable income are based on the same underlying economic 
transactions, increasing book income will in many cases increase taxable income. In 
other words, if book income is increased while taxable income is not, tax 
noncompliant behavior is probably committed. It is known that an increase in book 
income will normally lead to an increase in taxable income as well, even when 
accounting and tax regulations are separated. That is, if book income is overstated 
accompanying larger book tax differences, tax authorities may suspect that tax 
noncompliance exists, and thus additional tax related costs are likely to be incurred. 
On the other hand, when the accounting income remains unchanged, reducing 
taxable income can also lead to larger book tax differences. Prior literature (Cloyd et 
al., 1996; Mills, 1996, 1998; Mills and Sansing, 2001) suggests that book tax 
differences attract the attention of the tax authorities, increase the possibility of tax 
examination, and thus incur extra tax costs. Cloyd et al. (1996) find that book-tax 
conformity decreases the probability of the IRS’ audit and scrutiny. Mills (1996) 
finds that tax audit adjustments by the IRS increase as conformity between 
accounting for financial reporting and tax reporting decreases, and argues that 
reporting higher book income relative to taxable income may incur additional tax 
costs relating to probable tax examination. Mills also examines the relationship 
between the level of book tax conformity and the variation in managers’ incentives 
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for book income reporting versus tax savings, and finds preliminary evidence that 
book income is closer to taxable income when tax incentives are more important than 
financial reporting incentives. Mills (1998) and Mills and Sansing (2000) conclude 
that book tax differences can be seen as a signal of aggressive tax reporting behavior, 
and book tax differences increase tax examination costs whenever the differences 
originate from understating taxable income or overstating accounting income. 
The other type of cost a firm faces, when reporting lower book income, is the 
non-tax financial reporting costs. In order to alleviate the scrutiny of tax authorities 
due to large book tax difference arising from understatement of taxable income, 
corporate managers may report lower book income to narrow the gap. However, 
reporting conformity would incur financial reporting costs, because firm contracts 
are usually connected with, or based on, accounting income. For example, managers’ 
compensation plans are often tied to the level of accounting income. Lower book 
income impairs their annual bonuses and personnel actions. Another example of an 
accounting-based contract is debt covenant, because book income has a great 
influence on a company’s future potential power of obtaining loans from banks. In 
addition, lowering book income negatively affects a firm’s market value and 
corporate reputation. 
Therefore, additional tax-related costs may be incurred when companies 
report large book tax differences. According to the Scholes-Wolfson conceptual 
framework, managers need to consider all taxes and all costs to choose the best book 
and tax reporting strategies with the highest expected utility. As such, there can be a 
close relationship between book tax differences and tax noncompliance, consistent 
with Mills (1998). 
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4.3 Research Hypothesis 
Tax and non-tax cost tradeoffs are not the same before and after substantial 
book tax separation. When financial accounting and tax rules were in alignment 
before 2001, the tax and non-tax tradeoff was simple, as book income and tax 
income varied in the same direction and with similar magnitude. In this context, 
managers traded off the relative importance of book income against taxable income, 
i.e., traded off the financial reporting benefits against tax savings. Specifically, if tax 
incentive outweighs book incentive, firms would report lower taxable income and 
correspondingly lower book income. Contrarily, if book incentive outweighs tax 
incentive, firms would report higher book income and pay higher tax as well. There 
were few additional tax costs in this situation, and these costs were irrelevant in the 
tradeoff consideration. 
 When accounting and tax rules became detached after 2000, thus creating an 
opportunity for firms to manipulate both book income and taxable income separately, 
firms had to consider extra costs of tax examination and tax fines, which firms did 
not have to consider before book tax separation. More specifically, when tax 
incentive outweighs book incentive, firms may report lower taxable income without 
affecting book income. In China, taxable income is calculated based on book income 
and through a number of tax deductions. Book tax separation increases the 
complexity of reconciliation between book income and taxable income. Firms may 
have more opportunities and flexibility to minimize taxable income with less of an 
effect on book income. For example, a firm may record bad debt provisions (a 
partially deductible adjusting item) exceeding 0.5% of accounts receivable year-end 
balances for financial accounting reporting purposes. When calculating taxable 
income that uses book income as a starting point in the tax returns, the firm may 
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intentionally not add back the proportion of bad debt provisions that exceeds the 
limit allowable by the tax rules. As a result, taxable income determined is smaller 
than the correct one based on tax rules, and the resultant book tax difference becomes 
larger. 8 Another example is the tax deductible adjusting item – profits obtained from 
affiliate companies. Firms may intentionally exclude these profits more than the 
actual amount obtained. As such, taxable income is decreased with book income 
unaffected, and book tax differences become larger.9 Similar cases can be found for 
all other book tax differential items, including both tax deductible and non-
deductible adjusting items, such as seven free-choice provisions, income for previous 
loss making-up and so on.10 When book incentive outweighs tax incentive, some 
firms may be able to report higher book income with little impact on taxable income. 
In fact, it is even more likely for firms to overstate book income and understate 
                                                 
8 I assume the following numerical example. Suppose the book income before considering bad debt 
provisions is $10,000,000, and taxable income before considering these provisions is $8,000,000 (i.e., 
assume that this amount is obtained by starting from the book income and subjected to a number of 
adjusting items). Also assume that the firm, based on its specific situation, records bad debt provisions 
at an average 10% of accounts receivable ending balances of $5,000,000 for financial reporting. Based 
on these numbers, the book income after considering the bad debt provisions should be $9,500,000 
($10,000,000 - $5,000,000 * 10%). As the stipulated percentage of bad debt provision by tax rules is 
0.5% of ending balances of accounts receivable, the correct amount of bad debt provision that ought to 
be added back to the taxable income should be $475,000 ($5,000,000 * (10% - 0.5%)), and thus the 
correct amount of taxable income should be $8,475,000 ($8,000,000 + $475,000). Therefore, book tax 
differences absent of tax avoidance should be $1,025,000 ($9,500,000 - $8,475,000). When the firm 
intends to reduce taxable income by not adding back the amounts of $475,000, book tax differences 
will become $1,500,000 ($9,500,000 - $8,000,000). As a result, book tax differences increase by 
$475,000 ($1,500,000 - $ 1,025,000), originating from an intentionally understatement of taxable 
income while book income is not affected.  
 
9 Suppose the book income and taxable income before considering profits obtained from affiliate 
companies are $10,000,000 and $8,000,000, respectively. Also assume that the amount of profits 
obtained from affiliate companies is $100,000, which is fully tax deductible. Further assume that the 
firm intentionally deducts $110,000 (i.e. $10,000 more than the actual amount) for tax reporting. 
Based on these numbers, the book income after considering profits obtained from affiliate companies 
should be $10,100,000 ($10,000,000+$100,000). The correct amount of taxable income should be 
$7,900,000 ($8,000,000-$100,000), while the incorrect amount due to over-deduction should be 
$7,890,000 ($8,000,000-$110,000). As a result, the correct book tax difference is $2,200,000 
($10,100,000-$7,900,000), while the incorrect one is $2,210,000 ($10,100,000-$7,890,000). Therefore, 
book tax differences would increase by $10,000 ($2,210,000-$2,200,000), as taxable income is 
decreased by the same amount while book income is not affected. 
 
10 For more adjusting items, see Table 1. 
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taxable income simultaneously to obtain both financial reporting and tax benefits.11
 All these cases indicate that both tax deductible and non-deductible adjusting 
items are likely to attract the tax authorities’ attention when book tax difference 
arises, and firms may incur tax-related costs as a result. Tax authorities may suspect 
that there could be something wrong when a firm reports large book tax difference, 
and therefore would regard book tax difference as a red flag of tax noncompliance 
behavior. 
 In this way, the major distinction of tax and non-tax tradeoffs before and after 
book tax separation is that additional tax-related costs have a greater impact on the 
tradeoff between tax incentives and financial reporting incentives after separation 
than before. In addition, there may be more incentives for tax planning after book tax 
separation than before. These differential incentives for tax planning are ascribed to 
                                                 
11 Continue with the above numerical example of bad debt provision. It is also very likely that firms 
can intentionally record less bad provision for financial reporting (e.g., only 8% instead of 10%) to 
overstate book income, while taxable income is still reduced. Suppose the taxable income before bad 
debt provisions are considered becomes $8,100,000. (This assumption is reasonable, because taxable 
income should be increased accordingly when book income is overstated.) The new book income 
would be $9,600,000 ($10,000,000 - $5,000,000 * 8%), an overstatement of $100,000 from the 
previous one ($9,600,000 - $9,500,000. The correct amount of taxable income should be $8,475,000 
($8,100,000 + $5,000,000 * (8% - 0.5%). While the book tax difference absent of tax avoidance and 
earnings management is $1,025,000 ($9,600,000 - $8,475,000), book tax differences in the presence 
of tax avoidance and earnings management become $1,500,000 ($9,500,000 - $8,100,000). As a result, 
book tax differences increase by $475,000 ($1,500,000 - $1,025,000). In other words, book income is 
overstated by $100,000 and taxable income is understated simultaneously by $375,000 ($8,475,000 - 
$8,100,000).  
The much more sophisticated examples can be found in the Report of Investigation of Enron 
Corporation and Related Entities Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy 
Recommendations by Joint Committee on Taxation in the US in 2003. Enron deliberately structured 
complicated transactions to obtain financial reporting and tax benefits, by utilizing the various 
differential items of book and tax treatments. This report discusses 12 typical structured transactions 
from 1995 through 2001 when Enron was filed for bankruptcy. For example, Project Tanya, Project 
Valor, Project Steele, and Project Cochise that were designed to duplicate tax losses (i.e., deduct the 
same tax loss twice) generated significant accounting income; Project Thomas, Project Condor, and 
Project Teresa that were designed to shift tax basis from a non-depreciable asset to a depreciable asset 
also produce financial reporting benefits. 
For more details, see “Joint Committee on Taxation, Written Testimony of the Staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation on the Report of Investigation of Enron Corporation and Related Entities 
Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy Recommendations (JCX-10-03), 
February 13, 2003” and “Joint Committee on Taxation, Report of Investigation of Enron Corporation 
and Related Entities Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy Recommendations 
(JCS-3-03), February 2003”. 
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the fact that there is more room for manipulating book income and taxable income 
separately and more additional tax costs to consider after separation. 
According to the above discussion, book tax separation since 2001 may have 
led to large book tax differences and created more room for Chinese managers to 
manipulate accounting and tax income in a nonconforming manner. However, 
managers cannot costlessly maximize both financial reporting benefits and tax 
savings at the same time (Mills, 1998). Firms maximizing financial reporting benefits 
or minimizing current tax liabilities face probable costs of tax examination and 
sanctions. The tradeoff a firm makes between (1) current tax savings, (2) financial 
reporting benefits, and (3) costs of the examinations and fines may give rise to book 
tax differences. As book tax differences represent the possibility of aggressive tax 
planning (Mills, 1998), I hypothesize that: 
All else being equal, the magnitude of tax noncompliance for Chinese listed 
companies will be greater as book tax differences increase, especially after book tax 
separation in 2001.12 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Similar to other studies, this hypothesis assumes a low level of ethics amongst management in 
preparing accounts and tax returns. Quite a number of studies have documented the relationship 
between business ethics and tax compliance behavior. A thorough discussion would be beyond the 
scope of this study with the focus on the relationship between book tax difference and tax 
noncompliance behavior. For more details on business ethics and income tax, see relevant literature 
including Schwartz and Orleans (1967), Hunt and Vitell (1986), Jackson and Milliron (1986), Roth et 
al. (1989), Hite (1996), and Henderson and Kaplan (2005). 
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Chapter 5 
Research Design 
 
 This chapter describes data collection and sample selection, and develops a 
multiple regression model for empirical testing of hypothesis with regard to the 
relationship between book tax difference and tax noncompliance in China. 
 
5.1 Data collection and sample selection 
Since this study intends to investigate the effect of book tax differences 
which have originated from the separation of accounting and tax regulations on tax 
noncompliance behavior of listed Chinese companies, most data for the purpose of 
empirical testing are collected from annual reports of companies listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period 1998-2003.13 While book 
income, ownership structure, and other control variables are publicly available from 
financial statements, notes and announcements of the companies, taxable income and 
tax audit adjustments are obtained from local tax authorities and CPA firms.14 
                                                 
13 There are two major reasons why I choose data beginning from 1998. One reason is that it is 
difficult to find the hypothesized relationship as book tax differences are relatively small before 1998. 
The other reason is that partial delinking of book tax reporting taking place in 1998 provides an equal 
basis for analysis across the years. 
 
14 Some researchers argue that the use of unpublicized data, such as tax audit adjustments, may give 
rise to significant methodology issues, because it will be difficult for other researchers to replicate the 
study, and thus impair the validity and reliability of empirical results and conclusions. However, 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) argue that research using unpublicized data should be encouraged for 
several reasons. One reason is that such studies can also be replicated, because other researchers can 
access the same unpublicized data using different methods. In addition, in some sense, collecting 
unpublicized data is similar to collecting costly and private data, such as data collection in field 
research, experimental economics and so on. Another reason is that conclusions and theories obtained 
from unpublicized data can be tested and proved, although imperfectly, by studies using publicized 
data. Triangulation is possible to reexamine the conclusions, and thus enhance the validity and 
reliability. 
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The full sample consists of 3,000 firm-years during 1998-2003, that is, 500 
companies per year. As the total number of A-share companies is 825 in 1998, I 
randomly select 500 of them (264 in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 236 in the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange), and obtain data for the 500 A-share companies during 
the studied period. As there are missing values for some observations, 159 firm-years 
are excluded.15 Then I exclude 30 firm-years of financial institutions, because book 
tax separation in 2001 may not have any impact on financial institutions.16 To reduce 
noise and avoid the need to control for the effect of some variables on audit 
adjustments, I exclude 126 firm-years with zero or negative tax audit adjustments 
(i.e., taxable incomes filed by listed companies are larger than, or equal to, audited 
taxable incomes by tax authorities). I further exclude 466 firm-years with zero or 
negative book tax differences (i.e., taxable incomes are larger than, or equal to, pre-
tax accounting incomes in the annual financial reports), because the magnitude of tax 
audit adjustments may not be associated with negative book tax differences (Mills, 
1998).17 I also exclude 12 firm-years with standardized residuals larger than 3 as 
                                                 
15 As the sample companies are selected by random, the problem of sample selection bias should not 
exist. However, self-selection bias may exist because of tax authorities’ choice of tax audit subjects 
(Mills, 1998). In China, not all listed companies are audited by the tax authorities each year due to a 
lack of resources. Thus, self-selection error may arise in the regression analysis. The probability of 
being audited by tax authorities may be associated with some firm characteristics, such as size, 
ownership structure, and financial status. Due to the difficulty of collecting unpublicized data, whether 
those companies excluded from the sample are audited or not cannot be determined, that is, the 
probability of being tax audited is unknown. Thus, possible self-selection bias cannot be corrected in 
this study. Future studies may be needed to solve the problem by accessing more unpublicized data. 
 
16 The new Accounting system for Business Enterprises and some other accounting standards are not 
applicable to financial institutions, such as banks and security companies. Instead, they should follow 
the Accounting System for Financial Institutions effective on January 1, 2002. 
 
17 In the sensitivity tests, the hypothesized relationship is examined for the sample consisting of zero 
and negative tax audit adjustments and book tax differences. In addition, another sensitivity test is 
performed to reexamine the main results when observations with zero and negative tax audit 
adjustments and book tax differences are included in the main sample. Zero and negative observations 
are treated as tax compliant, and transformed into one for regression analysis. 
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outliers for the purpose of regression tests.18 Hence, the final sample consists of 
2,207 firm-year observations. 
 
5.2 Regression Model 
Both univariate and multivariate analysis are used to examine the association 
between tax audit adjustments and book tax differences pre- and post-delinking of 
tax accounting from financial accounting. I first use independent sample t-test to 
compare the mean tax audit adjustments and book tax differences in terms of pre- 
and post-200019. I also use the Kruskal-Wallis Test and median tests to compare the 
median tax audit adjustments and book tax differences for the two periods. Then I 
calculate the simple correlation for the final sample to preliminarily examine the 
extent to which book tax differences are correlated with tax audit adjustments, and to 
check for the existence of any multicollinearity problem. 
To test the hypothesis, I establish the following multiple regression model. 
Ln(TAXADJ) =a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER 
  +a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei 
 
where: 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales 
revenue. 
Explanatory variables: 
BT = pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by 
sales revenue. 
POST00 = 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years 
subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise. 
                                                 
18 Outliers need to be eliminated, as the presence of outliers will adversely affect the fitted values of 
the regression model, and may give rise to the problem of heteroscedasticity, which can cause 
difficulties of hypothesis testing due to inefficient estimators, and bring about misleading results. 
19 “Pre-2000” and “prior to 2000” include the year 2000, and “post-2000” and “subsequent to 2000” 
do not include the year 2000. 
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Control variables: 
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of 
institutional shares, zero otherwise. 
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stock in the next two years, zero 
otherwise. 
AGE = number of years since the company’s initial public offering. 
SIZE = natural logarithm of year-end total assets. 
INDUSTRYi = dummy variables representing 13 sub-industries. 
 
The dependent variable is measured as the magnitude of tax audit adjustments 
scaled by sales revenue, subject to a natural logarithm transformation. The natural 
logarithm always makes sense, since companies with zero or negative tax audit 
adjustments are excluded from the sample, and tax audit adjustments and sales 
revenue are positive all the time in this context 
Three explanatory variables are included in the regression model. BT, 
representing book tax differences, is equal to pre-tax accounting income less taxable 
income, scaled by sales revenue. The expected coefficient of this variable will be 
positive, because I predict that tax audit adjustments will be greater as book tax 
differences increase. POST00 is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if tax audit 
adjustments occurred after 2000, and equals 0 otherwise. If tax audit adjustments are 
greater after the separation of accounting and tax regulations in 2001, the coefficient 
of POST00 will be positive. The interaction term POST00*BT tests the hypothesis 
that book-tax differences subsequent to 2000 result in greater tax audit adjustments 
than those prior to 2000. A positive coefficient on this interaction term suggests that 
book tax differences are more predictive of tax aggressiveness subsequent to 2000. 
Five audit adjustment related variables are included as control variables. Prior 
literature suggests that ownership type (public and private) has an impact on book tax 
differences and tax noncompliance behavior (Cloyd et al., 1996; Mills, 1996, 1998; 
Mills and Newberry, 2001). Cloyd et al. (1996) argue that public firms are less 
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aggressive in tax noncompliance than private firms, because public firms face more 
significant financial reporting costs originating from capital market pressure and 
agency problems. Mills (1996) and Mills and Newberry (2001) find that public firms 
have a larger book tax difference than private firms, because public firms face more 
non-tax costs, and have fewer incentives for book tax conformity. Mills (1998) 
suggests that public firms have less tax audit adjustments than private firms, as 
higher financial reporting costs restrict public firms from engaging in tax 
noncompliance activities. As I examine the tax noncompliance behavior of publicly 
traded firms in this study, ownership structure may be more applicable here than 
ownership type. In China’s capital market, stock shares of listed companies consist 
of state shares, institutional shares, and individual shares. In the early years, most 
listed companies’ stocks are dominated by state shares. State shares have recently 
been gradually decreasing. Thus, control of ownership structure is applicable in this 
context. In the regression model, the dummy variable OWNER, as a measure of 
ownership structure, equals 1 if the percentage of state ownership of a company is 
greater than that of institutional shares, and equals 0 otherwise. In other words, 
OWNER=1 represents the state-dominated or government-controlled companies. In 
China, the tax incentives of state-dominated versus other companies are different. As 
managers of state-dominated companies regard tax payment submitted to the 
government as a symbol of prestige and success, they may have little incentive to 
intentionally report lower taxable income and to engage in tax noncompliance 
behavior. Therefore, I expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative. 
 As prior studies suggest that financial stress is associated with book tax 
differences and tax noncomplicance (Bradley, 1994; Mills and Newberry, 2001), the 
dummy variable STRESS is included in the regression. STRESS equals 1 if the 
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company issues new stock in the next two years, and equals 0 otherwise.20 In China, 
there are relevant regulations on stock rights issue, which create pressures on listed 
companies to meet a target profitability level. In order to satisfy the requirements, 
listed companies may attempt to mitigate the financial stress by manipulating 
earnings and tax payments. That is, if a company intends to raise additional capital 
through rights issue, it is likely that the company may manipulate both earnings and 
tax liabilities to present a healthy cash flow in their annual financial statements 
(Chen et al., 2000). As such, the coefficient is expected to be positive. 
 The variable AGE represents firm age, that is, the number of years since a 
company’s initial public offering (IPO). Based on the US data, Murray (1995) finds 
that older companies are less compliant with sales tax regulations than newer 
companies, but this conclusion does not involve income tax noncompliance. Based 
on China, DeFond et al. (2001) argue that as firms are getting older, they are more 
likely to have exhausted capital raised in the IPOs. Thus, they may be aggressive in 
tax planning in order to improve their cash flows. However, it is also possible that 
the longer a firm is listed, the more mature and established it becomes in the industry, 
and hence the less likely the firm will engage in tax avoidance activities. Therefore, I 
do not predict the sign of the coefficient. 
 The control variable SIZE is measured as total assets subject to a natural 
logarithm transformation. Rice (1992) finds that firm size has a positive association 
with tax noncompliance. On the contrary, Mills (1998) argues that as large firms may 
have more resources for tax planning, it will be difficult for tax authorities to detect 
                                                 
20 One of the requirements for stock rights issue in China prior to March 1999 was that the return on 
equity (ROE) of each year was no less than 10% for the past three consecutive years. In March 1999, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated a new regulation which specified that a 
company was qualified for stock rights issue if (a) the average ROE for the past three years was no 
less than 10% and (b) the ROE of each year in the past three years was no less than 6%. In March 
2001, the requirement was modified again. From then on, the qualification concerning ROE for stock 
rights issue is that the average ROE (lowering of ROE with exclusion and inclusion of extraordinary 
items) for the past three years is no less than 6%. 
 38 
their noncompliance behavior. On the other hand, as large firms are more visible to 
the public and tax authorities, they have less incentive to undertake tax 
noncompliance. As such, I do not make any prediction on the sign of this variable. 
 Finally, the dummy variable INDUSTRYi controls for firm fixed effects in 
the pooled regression. The coding of INDUSTRYi is based on the industry 
classification proposed by the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. There are 
thirteen industries in this classification, and the industry of financial institutions is 
excluded as mentioned before. 
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Chapter 6 
Empirical Results 
 
This chapter presents data analysis results for hypothesis testing, including 
descriptive statistics, univariate tests of mean comparison (independent samples t-test) 
and median comparison (Kruskal-Wallis Test and Median Tests), simple correlation 
matrix, and multiple regression test. The results of various sensitivity tests are also 
reported in this chapter. 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 lists the major items resulting in book tax differences for 2,207 firm-
year observations. For tax non-deductible adjusting items, bad debt provision, seven 
free-choice allowances, and capital expenditure, average 42.23%, 36.23%, and 
8.16% of total tax non-deductible adjustments over the study period, respectively.21 
For tax deductible adjusting items, profits obtained from affiliate companies, income 
for previous loss making-up, and interest revenue of treasury bond, take up 40.44%, 
26.90%, and 7.33%, on average, of total tax deductible adjustments, respectively. 
These differential items, due to the divergence of accounting and tax regulations, 
produce book tax differences, which constitute the necessary background of this 
empirical study. 
[Table 1] 
                                                 
21 The seven free-choice allowances significantly decrease in 2002 and 2003. The possible reason is 
that after firms record more seven free-choice allowances than the amount they should be, the 
overstated portion may have been released in the subsequent years. 
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by year for the variables used in the 
empirical tests. Tax audit adjustments average 0.51% of sales revenue, and fluctuate 
slightly between 0.46% and 0.63% of sales revenue over the study period. Book tax 
difference is about 17.25% of sales revenue, and it increases gradually in the period 
1998-2000, but sharply in the period 2001-2003, indicating that book tax separation 
did lead to larger book tax differences subsequent to 2000. The medians of TAXADJ 
and BT (0.22% and 6.29% respectively) are much lower than their means, suggesting 
that the observations with larger tax audit adjustment and book tax difference deviate 
from the means much more than those with smaller tax audit adjustment and book 
tax difference. The standard deviations of TAXADJ and BT are 0.0098 and 0.5347, 
which appear to be large enough for statistical analysis. 
For the 2,207 firm-year observations, about 59% of firm-years are state-
dominated, and 47% face financial stress. The mean number of years since IPO is 
6.05, and the average firm size is RMB 187 million. 
[Table 2] 
 
6.2 Univariate and bivariate tests 
The sample period is divided into two for the empirical tests. Period I (pre-
delinking period) refers to the years 1998-2000, and period II (post-delinking period) 
refers to the years 2001-2003. Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics by period and 
the results of univariate comparison of mean, median, and variance between the two 
periods. The mean adjustment scaled by sales revenue for period II is greater than 
period I (0.54% vs. 0.49%), but they are not significantly different. As expected, the 
mean book tax difference scaled by sales revenue for period II is significantly larger 
than period I (23.39% vs. 12.55%), at the 0.01 significance level. These statistics 
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provide suggestive evidence that separation of accounting and tax regulations in 
2001 did lead to a larger book tax difference and tax audit adjustment. The results of 
Levene’s tests for equality of variance indicate that TAXADJ and BT significantly 
vary much more in period II than in period I. This may lead to the problem of 
heteroscedesticity in the regression analysis (Gujarati, 2003). Thus, TAXADJ is 
subjected to the natural logarithm in the regression model to mitigate the problem. 
 [Table 3] 
Table 4 presents Pearson correlations amongst the variables used in the study. 
With respect to correlations between TAXADJ and the other variables, except the 
negative correlation between TAXADJ and STRESS, the directions of pairwise 
correlations are generally in accordance with previous predictions. Specifically, 
TAXADJ is significantly correlated with the interaction term POST00*BT (r=0.314, 
p=0.000), preliminarily supporting the hypothesis that book tax difference is more 
indicative of tax noncompliance after 2001 than before 2001. However, since the 
simple correlations do not control for other effects, evidence from the correlation 
matrix is not affirmatory. 
All correlations between independent variables are below 0.30, except 
correlations between BT and POST00*BT (0.924), between STRESS and POST00 (-
0.375), between AGE and POST00 (0.597), and between STRESS and AGE (-0.312). 
As BT and the interaction term POST00*BT have an approximate linear relationship, 
a serious multicollinearity problem may exist. Although the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimators are still BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimators) in the regression 
model, their standard errors are higher, making the t-statistics lower and p-value 
higher. This makes it difficult to interpret individual coefficients. To correct for the 
problem of multicollinearity, BT is subject to Z-standardization by year (Kim, 1999; 
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Fischer, 2004).22 The major advantage of the standardization transformation of BT is 
that the multicollinearity problem between BT and POST00*BT can be removed or 
dramatically reduced by standardization, without losing information in the original 
regression model (Kim, 1999).  
 [Table 4] 
 
6.3 Multivariate test 
 Table 5 presents the results of pooled regression of tax audit adjustment on 
book tax difference for the 2,207 firm-year observations. The explanatory variable 
BT is positively related to tax audit adjustment, although it is not significant 
(a1=0.030, t=1.265, p=0.206). This insignificance may be due to a weak relationship 
between tax noncompliance and book tax difference prior to book tax separation in 
2001. The coefficient of POST00 is significant at 0.01 (a2=0.062, t=2.723, p=0.007), 
suggesting that the magnitude of tax audit adjustments before 2000 significantly 
differ from the magnitude after 2000. The interaction term POST00*BT has a 
significantly positive relationship with tax audit adjustments (a3=0.100, t=4.220, 
p=0.000). These results support the hypothesis that the magnitude of tax 
noncompliance is more closely related to book tax difference after compared to 
before the separation of accounting and tax regulations in 2001. I estimate that when 
compared with pre-2000, tax audit adjustment in post-2000 will be (on average) 
                                                 
22 Based on Kim (1999) and Fischer (2004), BT is subjected to Z-standardization transformation as 
follows. 
  Standardized BTt = (BTt - Mean (BTt) ) / Standard Deviation (BTt)  
  Standardized POST00* BTt = POST00 * Standardized BTt 
   (t=1998,…,2003) 
The resulting means and standard deviations of BTt in each year is zero and one respectively. 
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greater by 0.05% of sales revenue as book tax difference increases by one 
standardized unit.23 
[Table 5] 
 The results of control variables are mixed. The signs of the coefficients of 
OWNER and STRESS are contrary to prior expectation, but they are not significant. 
The coefficient of the variable AGE is negative and significant, suggesting that tax 
audit adjustments are smaller for older companies, possibly because once firms have 
become more established, they are less inclined to enter into tax shelter activities. 
The variable SIZE is negatively related to tax audit adjustment at the 0.01 level, 
consistent with Mills’ (1998) discussion that large firms are more capable of tax 
planning, and therefore tax authorities face more challenges in detecting their tax 
noncompliance behaviors. 
                                                 
23 Suppose there is the regression εαα +×+= XYLn 10)( . We can interpret α1 as follows. 
Y
dX
dY
dX
YdY ×=⇒= 11 / αα  
Therefore, as X increases by one unit, Y increases by Y×1α units on average. 
In the pooled regression of tax audit adjustment on book tax difference (control variables are included 
inε ), 
εαααα +××+×+×+= )00(00)( 3210 BTPOSTPOSTBTTAXADJLn  
when POST00=0, εαα +×+= BTTAXADJLn 10)( . 
When POST00=1, εαααα +×+++= BTTAXADJLn )()()( 3120 . 
Hence, the results can be interpreted as follows. When POST00=0, as BT increases by one 
standardized unit, TAXADJ increases by 
01 )(TAXADJ×α  (i.e., 0.030*0.0049=0.000147), 
where 0)(TAXADJ  represents the mean of TAXADJ for pre-2000 observations. When POST00=1, 
as BT increases by one standardized unit, TAXADJ increases by 
131 )()( TAXADJ×+αα  (i.e., (0.030+0.100)*0.0054=0.000702), 
where 1)(TAXADJ  represents the mean of TAXADJ for post-2000 observations. Moreover, as BT 
increases by one standardized unit, there is, on average, 
])()()[( 01131 TAXADJTAXADJ ×−×+ ααα  
(i.e. (0.030+0.100)*0.0054-0.030*0.0049=0.000555) 
more units increase in TAXADJ after 2000 than before. 
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 The overall model fit of this pooled regression is reasonably good (Adjusted 
R-square=0.318; F=61.597; p-value=0.000), and has enough explanatory power to 
test the hypothesis on the relationship between tax noncompliance and book tax 
difference. All variance inflation factor values of independent variables are less than 
one, indicating that no serious multicollinearity problem exists in the regression 
model after BT is subjected to Z-standardization transformation. To check the 
problem of heteroscedasticity, the scatter graph is plotted with estimated squared 
residual as the y-axis and estimated dependent variable as the x-axis. No systematic 
pattern is identified, indicating no serious heteroscedasticity in the regression model. 
Also, White’s test is performed, and the null hypothesis that homoscedasticity 
prevails is not rejected at 0.01. Therefore, the regression results are reliable and 
credible. 
 
6.4 Sensitivity tests 
 To check the robustness of the regression results, several additional 
regression tests are conducted. Table 6 presents the results of these sensitivity tests. 
 First, annual regressions are performed to examine the yearly relationships 
between book tax difference and tax audit adjustment. 24  For the three annual 
regressions prior to 2000, the coefficients of BT are all positive but insignificant, 
while for the three annual regressions subsequent to 2000, the coefficients of BT are 
all positive and significant at 0.01. Regressions by the two periods (pre-2000 and 
post-2000) are also performed. For the pre-delinking period, BT is insignificantly 
positively related to TAXADJ (a1=0.040, t=1.571, p=0.116). For the post-delinking 
                                                 
24  Mills (1998) argues that an alternative to the pooled regression with fixed effects is annual 
regressions, which eliminates potential understated standard errors and removes the yearly 
measurement error to some extent. 
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period, BT has a significantly positive relationship with TAXADJ (a1=0.156, t=5.796, 
p=0.000). These additional analyses provide reinforcing evidence to support the 
hypothesis. 
 Second, tax audit adjustment and book tax difference are scaled by total 
assets, instead of sales revenue, to validate the empirical results. Compared with the 
previous empirical results, the coefficient of BT becomes negative but is still 
insignificant, and the coefficient of POST00 is positive and insignificant. The 
coefficient of the interaction term POST00*BT is positive and significant (a3=0.290, 
t=4.615, p=0.000), consistent with the main results. As for the control variables, the 
coefficient of STRESS becomes positive and significant (a5=0.076, t=3.531, 
p=0.000). Although it is different from the previous pooled regression results, the 
result is consistent with the literature and the prior prediction that the financial stress 
rooted in the motivation of stock rights issue puts pressure on the listed companies in 
China, and has an influence on their tax noncompliance behavior. However, the 
contradictory results are not conclusive. In addition, the coefficient of AGE becomes 
insignificant, which fails to validate the result in the previous regression that age has 
significant impacts on tax audit adjustment. 
 Third, I examined the sample consisting of zero and negative tax audit 
adjustments and book tax differences. Tax audit adjustment and book tax difference 
are scaled by sales revenue (not subject to natural logarithm transformation) and total 
assets in two separate regression equations. No relationships are found, and all 
explanatory variables and control variables are insignificant at 0.05. The results are 
similar to Mills’ (1998) study, in which she asserts that the insignificant relationship 
should not be surprising, and it cannot be concluded temporarily whether managers 
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can manipulate book income and taxable income without cost when book tax 
differences are negative. 
 Finally, observations with zero and negative tax audit adjustments and book 
tax differences are added back into the main sample, with zero and negative tax audit 
adjustments transformed into one unit of local currency. The hypothesis is not clearly 
supported, as the coefficients of BT and POST00*BT in the two regressions, with tax 
audit adjustments and book tax differences scaled by sales revenue and total assets, 
respectively, are not consistent. OWNER is significant in the regression of Panel D1 
at 0.05, but becomes insignificant in the regression of Panel D2, and thus the 
influence of ownership structure is not conclusive. SIZE is significant in both 
regressions, which is consistent with the main results. 
[Table 6] 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Limitations 
 
 This chapter summarizes main results of this empirical study, and discusses 
several limitations and possible areas for future research. 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
 Most tax noncompliance research has been conducted based on data from the 
US and other developed countries. Studies on tax noncompliance in developing 
countries are limited. China’s substantial separation of accounting and tax 
regulations in the late 1990s, especially in 2001, offers an opportunity to examine 
Mills’ (1998) findings on the relationship between book tax difference and tax 
noncompliance in the transitional economy framework. Due to China’s specific 
context, the relationship studied here is different from that of Mills. In China, tax and 
non-tax cost tradeoffs before and after book tax separation are not the same, as 
additional tax-related costs have to be considered by managers to achieve 
maximization of expected financial and tax benefits. In addition, companies have 
differential incentives of tax planning in the two periods, because there is different 
room for managers to manipulate book income and taxable income freely. Based on 
the tax and non-tax cost tradeoff, I hypothesize that the magnitude of tax 
noncompliance increases as the book tax difference increases, especially after the 
book tax separation in 2001. 
 The sample for the study comprises the companies listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges during the period 1998-2003, with 2,207 firm-year 
observations. Publicized data are collected from annual financial reports, notes, 
 48 
announcements, and other documents, while unpublicized data are obtained from 
local tax authorities and CPA firms. Univariate and multivariate methods are 
performed to test the hypothesis, including independent sample t-test, Kruskal-Wallis 
test and median test, Pearson correlations, and multiple regression analysis. The 
empirical results suggest that book tax difference arising from the separation of book 
tax rules is positively related to tax audit adjustment, and that the relationship is more 
significant subsequent to 2000 than before, consistent with the hypothesis stated in 
the study. After book tax separation, book tax difference becomes more informative 
about tax aggressiveness in China. The results imply that although it is necessary for 
financial accounting regulations and tax rules to separate, policy makers, when 
setting financial accounting standards, should consider not only the true and fair view 
of financial accounting on the capital market, but also the impact of tax 
noncompliance behavior on government revenue. There should be an optimal level 
of divergence of accounting and tax rules, where truthfulness and fairness of 
financial accounting are best attained, and at the same time the magnitude of tax 
noncompliance is minimized. 
 
7.2 Limitations and suggestions for future studies 
 There are several potential limitations in this empirical analysis. First, no 
statistically significant relationship between negative book tax difference and tax 
audit adjustment is found. This is possibly because the regression model is not 
powerful enough to test the relation, which should be investigated by further studies. 
Further research may try devising a proper model to test whether negative book tax 
difference is correlated with negative tax audit adjustment, complementing the 
results of this study. Second, prior literature suggests that tax noncompliance can be 
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decomposed into book tax conforming noncompliance and book tax difference 
noncompliance (Chan and Mo, 2002). Nevertheless, the decomposition is 
constrained by data availability. Future research on this area should be warranted. 
Third, it is premature to conclude whether financial stress and firm age have impacts 
on tax noncompliance, as the empirical results are mixed when tax audit adjustment 
and book tax difference are scaled by sales revenue and total assets in two separate 
regressions. Future studies may focus on the effects of these two factors on tax 
noncompliance behavior. Fourth, self-selection bias may arise because firm 
characteristics and other factors may influence tax authorities’ choice of tax audit 
targets. The existence of the problem may result in misleading conclusions. However, 
self-selection bias cannot be corrected in this study due to a lack of relevant data. 
Future research may be needed to take the self-selection problem into analysis by 
accessing more relevant unpublicized data. Finally, studies on tax noncompliance 
behavior based on data from other developing countries are needed to strengthen and 
triangulate the results of this study, and to provide more reference for other 
economies experiencing a similar transition of tax-based accounting to international 
accounting standards. 
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Table 1 Sources of Book Tax Difference 
Sources of Book Tax Difference 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Tax Non-deductible Adjusting Items (%)        
Bad Debt Provisions 18.97% 55.18% 30.36% 16.14% 72.46% 58.67% 42.23% 
Seven Free-Choice Allowances 19.65% 32.85% 29.23% 71.28% 4.66% 6.87% 36.23% 
Capital Expenditure 22.06% 4.41% 14.53% 4.74% 9.93% 13.14% 8.16% 
Salary Expenses 11.40% 2.21% 7.50% 2.38% 3.71% 6.05% 3.90% 
Business Reception Expenses 5.65% 1.09% 3.55% 1.06% 1.93% 3.16% 1.91% 
Sponsoring Expenditure 3.65% 0.69% 2.42% 0.72% 1.22% 1.98% 1.24% 
Donations for Commonweal and Relief Purpose 3.60% 0.69% 2.37% 0.69% 1.16% 1.87% 1.20% 
Donations Not for Commonweal and Relief Purpose 3.48% 0.67% 2.33% 0.67% 1.15% 1.92% 1.18% 
Expenditure Not Related to Sales 2.67% 0.52% 1.77% 0.53% 0.86% 1.46% 0.91% 
Miscellaneous Items 8.87% 1.69% 5.94% 1.79% 2.92% 4.88% 3.04% 
     Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Tax Deductible Adjusting Items (%)        
Profits Obtained from Affiliate Companies 49.84% 46.38% 49.09% 35.68% 30.81% 30.07% 40.44% 
Income for Previous Loss Making-up 6.89% 16.55% 16.34% 33.08% 41.20% 46.16% 26.90% 
Interest Revenue of Treasury Bond 10.18% 8.50% 7.90% 6.57% 6.37% 4.95% 7.33% 
Dividends Obtained 9.38% 8.01% 7.27% 5.79% 5.15% 4.23% 6.58% 
Technology Transferring Proceeds 5.07% 4.96% 4.49% 4.43% 3.86% 2.54% 4.16% 
Foreign Income 2.39% 1.93% 2.15% 1.85% 1.60% 2.17% 2.03% 
Profits from “Three Wastes” Harnessing 2.73% 2.15% 2.08% 2.02% 1.62% 1.52% 2.00% 
Miscellaneous Items 13.52% 11.52% 10.68% 10.58% 9.39% 8.36% 10.56% 
     Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: The percentages presented in the table are equal to the proportions of the amounts of the line-items to the total tax non-deductible 
adjustments for tax non-deductible adjusting items and to the total tax deductible adjustments for tax deductible adjusting items. 
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Table 2  Descriptive Statistics by Year 
Variables Descriptive 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Pooled 
N  428 409 414 359 297 300 2207 
Mean 0.0053 0.0047 0.0046 0.0063 0.0050 0.0046 0.0051 
Median 0.0027 0.0024 0.0020 0.0023 0.0018 0.0016 0.0022 
Std. Dev. 0.0077 0.0084 0.0080 0.0144 0.0088 0.0104 0.0098 
Minimum 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Tax Audit Adjustment / Sales 
Maximum 0.0753 0.1082 0.0824 0.1594 0.0698 0.1315 0.1594 
Mean 0.1170 0.1216 0.1380 0.1771 0.2391 0.2968 0.1725 
Median 0.0819 0.0717 0.0730 0.0524 0.0366 0.0447 0.0629 
Std. Dev. 0.1535 0.2245 0.3580 0.5846 0.8339 0.8384 0.5347 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0013 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Book Tax Difference / Sales 
Maximum 2.2968 3.2994 5.8204 7.1969 8.2427 6.6344 8.2427 
Mean 0.6100 0.5900 0.5900 0.5700 0.5900 0.5900 0.5900 
Median 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Std. Dev. 0.4890 0.4920 0.4930 0.4960 0.4920 0.4930 0.4920 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
OWNER 
(Dummy) 
Maximum 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Mean 0.7500 0.6400 0.5000 0.3100 0.2000 0.2400 0.4700 
Median 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Std. Dev. 0.4310 0.4820 0.5010 0.4650 0.3970 0.4280 0.4990 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
STRESS 
(Dummy) 
Maximum 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Mean 3.7600 4.7400 5.8000 6.7900 7.7800 8.8100 6.0500 
Median 3.0000 4.0000 5.0000 6.0000 7.0000 8.0000 6.0000 
Std. Dev. 1.7590 1.7660 1.8000 1.8110 1.8390 1.8100 2.4670 
Minimum 2.0000 3.0000 4.0000 5.0000 6.0000 7.0000 2.0000 
AGE 
(Years) 
Maximum 9.0000 10.0000 11.0000 12.0000 13.0000 14.0000 14.0000 
Mean 11.4341 11.5861 11.7600 11.8063 11.9045 12.0402 11.7296 
Median 11.3508 11.5012 11.6904 11.7812 11.8791 12.0352 11.6739 
Std. Dev. 0.7824 0.8022 0.7850 0.8159 0.9189 0.9303 0.8548 
Minimum 9.5783 9.8228 9.9093 9.6232 9.8957 9.9051 9.5783 
SIZE 
Log (Total Asset) 
Maximum 13.6954 14.8073 14.6085 14.7226 14.9606 14.8300 14.9606 
 
 52 
Table 3  Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Comparison of Mean, Median and Variance by Period 
Test for Equality of Means 
(Independent Sample T-Test) Test for Equality of Median 
Equal Variance 
Assumed 
Equal Variance 
Not Assumed 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Test 
Median 
Test 
Test for Equality  
of Variance 
(Levene’s Test) Variables 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Period I 
(1998-2000) 
Period II 
(2001-2003) 
T P T P Chi-Square Asym. P Chi-Square Asym. P F P 
N  1251 956           
Mean 0.0049 0.0054 1.171 0.242 1.116 0.265       
Median 0.0024 0.0020     7.822 0.005 7.933 0.005   
Std. Dev. 0.0080 0.0117         11.304 0.001 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000           
Tax Audit Adjustment / 
Sales 
Maximum 0.1082 0.1594           
Mean 0.1255 0.2339 4.745 0.000 4.268 0.000       
Median 0.0762 0.0442     64.133 0.000 73.496 0.000   
Std. Dev. 0.2587 0.7524         104.688 0.000 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000           
Book Tax Difference / 
Sales 
Maximum 5.8204 8.2427           
Mean 0.6000 0.5800 -0.735 0.462 -0.734 0.463       
Median 1.0000 1.0000     0.540 0.462 N/A # N/A #   
Std. Dev. 0.4910 0.4940         2.098 0.148 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000           
OWNER 
(Dummy) 
Maximum 1.0000 1.0000           
Mean 0.6300 0.2500 -19.022 0.000 -19.283 0.000       
Median 1.0000 0.0000     310.984 0.000 311.125 0.000   
Std. Dev. 0.4820 0.4360         137.236 0.000 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000           
STRESS 
(Dummy) 
Maximum 1.0000 1.0000           
Mean 4.7600 7.7300 34.962 0.000 34.866 0.000       
Median 4.0000 7.0000     811.164 0.000 469.305 0.000   
Std. Dev. 1.9610 2.0020         0.768 0.381 
Minimum 2.0000 5.0000           
AGE 
(Years) 
Maximum 11.0000 14.0000           
Mean 11.5916 11.9102 8.826 0.000 8.702 0.000       
Median 11.5179 11.8877     77.702 0.000 57.444 0.000   
Std. Dev. 0.8004 0.8897         10.263 0.001 
Minimum 9.5783 9.6232           
SIZE 
(LogTA) 
Maximum 14.8073 14.9606           
# Median Test for OWNER cannot be performed, as all values are less than or equal to the median. 
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Table 4 Pearson Correlations Matrix 
Variables TAXADJ BT POST00 POST00*BT OWNER STRESS AGE SIZE 
TAXADJ 1.000 -        
BT 0.310* 0.000 
1.000 
-       
POST00 0.025 0.242 
0.101* 
0.000 
1.000 
-      
POST00*BT 0.314* 0.000 
0.924* 
0.000 
.228* 
0.000 
1.000 
-     
OWNER -0.017 0.422 
-0.021 
0.327 
-0.016 
0.462 
-0.015 
0.473 
1.000 
-    
STRESS -0.018 0.410 
-0.109* 
0.000 
-0.375* 
0.000 
-0.147* 
0.000 
0.025 
0.241 
1.000 
-   
AGE -0.009 0.688 
0.108* 
0.000 
0.597* 
0.000 
0.175* 
0.000 
-0.065* 
0.002 
-0.312* 
0.000 
1.000 
-  
SIZE -0.305* 0.000 
-0.209* 
0.000 
0.185* 
0.000 
-0.170* 
0.000 
0.071* 
0.001 
-0.031 
0.139 
0.209* 
0.000 
1.000 
- 
     *   Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
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Table 5  Pooled Regression of Tax Audit Adjustment on Book Tax Difference 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance VIF 
Explanatory Variables 
  BT + 0.030 1.265 0.206 0.549 1.822 
  POST00 + 0.062* 2.723 0.007 0.592 1.689 
  POST00*BT + 0.100* 4.220 0.000 0.553 1.809 
Control Variables 
  OWNER - 0.029 1.575 0.115 0.936 1.068 
  STRESS + -0.031 -1.617 0.106 0.833 1.201 
  AGE ? -0.097* -4.258 0.000 0.592 1.689 
  SIZE ? -0.450* -23.568 0.000 0.849 1.178 
  INDUSTRY Not Reported 
N: 2207      Adjusted R-square: 0.318      F: 61.597      p-value: 0.000 
          * Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
Ln(TAXADJ)=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei 
where: 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue. 
Explanatory variables: 
BT = pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue. 
POST00 = 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise. 
Control variables: 
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise. 
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise. 
AGE = number of years since the initial public offering. 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects. 
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Table 6   Sensitivity Tests 
Panel A1:   Annual Regressions of Tax Audit Adjustment on Book Tax Difference 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Variables Expected Sign Coef. T P Coef. T P Coef. T P Coef. T P Coef. T P Coef. T P 
BT + 0.012 0.259 0.796 0.036 0.811 0.418 0.073 1.678 0.094 0.186* 4.041 0.000 0.142* 2.918 0.004 0.139* 2.824 0.005 
OWNER - 0.057 1.294 0.196 0.010 0.212 0.832 0.022 0.490 0.625 0.055 1.229 0.220 0.005 0.110 0.913 0.027 0.563 0.574 
STRESS + 0.022 0.502 0.616 -0.005 -0.103 0.918 -0.019 -0.449 0.654 -0.023 -0.515 0.607 -0.073 -1.559 0.120 -0.044 -0.955 0.340 
AGE ? 0.000 0.001 0.999 -0.051 -1.123 0.262 -0.056 -1.285 0.199 -0.084 -1.868 0.063 -0.121 -2.503 0.013 -0.105 -2.229 0.027 
SIZE ? -0.398* -8.850 0.000 -0.439* -9.713 0.000 -0.410* -9.142 0.000 -0.390* -8.341 0.000 -0.504* -10.115 0.000 -0.514* -10.061 0.000 
INDUSTRY Not Reported 
N 428 409 414 359 297 300 
Adjusted R-square 0.211 0.227 0.249 0.334 0.374 0.408 
F 8.604 9.005 10.129 12.972 12.776 15.737 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
Ln(TAXADJ)t=a0t+a1tBT+a2tOWNER+a3tSTRESS+a4tAGE+a5tSIZE+aitINDUSTRYit+eit  (t=1998,…2003) 
where: 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue. 
Explanatory variables: 
BT = pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue. 
Control variables: 
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise. 
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise. 
AGE = number of years since the initial public offering. 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects. 
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Table 6   Sensitivity Tests (Continued) 
Panel A2:   Regressions of Tax Audit Adjustment on Book Tax Difference by Period 
Period I (1998-2000) Period II (2001-2003) Variables Expected sign Coefficient T P Coefficient T P 
BT + 0.040 1.571 0.116 0.156* 5.796 0.000 
OWNER - 0.028 1.114 0.265 0.029 1.089 0.276 
STRESS + -0.005 -0.205 0.838 -0.043 -1.688 0.092 
AGE ? -0.040 -1.554 0.120 -0.120* -4.588 0.000 
SIZE ? -0.419* -16.287 0.000 -0.472* -17.000 0.000 
INDUSTRY Not Reported 
N 1251 956 
Adjusted R-square 0.247 0.392 
F 28.348 41.994 
P 0.000 0.000 
* Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
Ln(TAXADJ)p=a0p+a1pBT+a2pOWNER+a3pSTRESS+a4pAGE+a5pSIZE+aipINDUSTRYip+eip  (p=1,2) 
where: 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue. 
Explanatory variables: 
BT = pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue. 
Control variables: 
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise. 
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise. 
AGE = number of years since the initial public offering. 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects. 
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continuted) 
Panel B: Pooled Regression with Tax Audit Adjustment and Book Tax Difference Scaled by Total Assets 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance VIF 
Explanatory Variables 
  BT + -0.077 -1.261 0.208 0.103 9.700 
  POST00 + 0.025 0.869 0.385 0.481 2.081 
  POST00*BT + 0.290* 4.615 0.000 0.097 10.336 
Control Variables 
  OWNER - 0.013 0.635 0.525 0.936 1.069 
  STRESS + 0.076* 3.531 0.000 0.833 1.200 
  AGE ? -0.032 -1.252 0.211 0.590 1.696 
  SIZE ? -0.269* -12.591 0.000 0.841 1.190 
  INDUSTRY Not Reported 
N: 2207      Adjusted R-square: 0.156      F: 24.949      p-value: 0.000 
          * Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
TAXADJ=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei 
where: 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue. 
Explanatory variables: 
BT = pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue. 
POST00 = 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise. 
Control variables: 
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise. 
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise. 
AGE = number of years since the initial public offering (IPO). 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects. 
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continued) 
Panel C1: Pooled Regression for the Sample of Zero and Negative 
Tax Audit Adjustment and Book Tax Difference Scaled by Sales Revenue 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance VIF 
Explanatory Variables 
  BT ? -0.770 -1.298 0.195 0.003 325.342 
  POST00 ? 0.041 1.050 0.294 0.694 1.441 
  POST00*BT ? 0.190 0.320 0.749 0.003 325.232 
Control Variables 
  OWNER ? -0.009 -0.246 0.806 0.868 1.151 
  STRESS ? -0.018 -0.530 0.597 0.914 1.095 
  AGE ? -0.038 -0.956 0.339 0.681 1.469 
  SIZE ? -0.002 -0.050 0.960 0.860 1.163 
  INDUSTRY Not Reported 
N: 592      Adjusted R-square: 0.361      F: 20.611      p-value: 0.000 
          * Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
Ln(TAXADJ)=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei 
where: 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue. 
Explanatory variables: 
BT = pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue. 
POST00 = 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise. 
Control variables: 
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise. 
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise. 
AGE = number of years since the initial public offering (IPO). 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects. 
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continued) 
Panel C2: Pooled Regression for the Sample of Zero and Negative 
Tax Audit Adjustment and Book Tax Difference Scaled by Total Assets 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance VIF 
Explanatory Variables 
  BT ? -0.076 -0.950 0.343 0.239 4.179 
  POST00 ? 0.056 1.193 0.233 0.697 1.435 
  POST00*BT ? -0.145 -1.824 0.069 0.239 4.180 
Control Variables 
  OWNER ? 0.009 0.208 0.836 0.871 1.148 
  STRESS ? -0.015 -0.363 0.717 0.912 1.097 
  AGE ? 0.036 0.758 0.449 0.678 1.474 
  SIZE ? -0.053 -1.244 0.214 0.834 1.198 
  INDUSTRY Not Reported 
N: 592      Adjusted R-square: 0.105      F: 5.095      p-value: 0.000 
            * Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
TAXADJ=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei 
where: 
Dependent variable: 
TAXADJ = tax audit adjustments divided by total assets. 
Explanatory variables: 
BT = pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by total assets. 
POST00 = 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise. 
Control variables: 
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise. 
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise. 
AGE = number of years since the initial public offering (IPO). 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects. 
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continued) 
Panel D1: Pooled Regression for the Main Sample Including Zero and Negative 
Tax Audit Adjustment (codes as 1) and Book Tax Difference Scaled by Sales Revenue 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance VIF 
Explanatory Variables 
  BT ? 0.057 0.611 0.542 0.030 32.974 
  POST00 ? -0.015 -0.653 0.514 0.538 1.860 
  POST00*BT ? -0.045 -0.484 0.629 0.030 33.102 
Control Variables 
  OWNER ? 0.038 2.228 0.026 0.930 1.075 
  STRESS ? 0.030 1.686 0.092 0.832 1.202 
  AGE ? -0.056* -2.617 0.009 0.584 1.712 
  SIZE ? -0.436* -25.053 0.000 0.882 1.133 
  INDUSTRY Not Reported 
N: 2799      Adjusted R-square: 0.253      F: 56.640      p-value: 0.000 
          * Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
Ln(TAXADJ)=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei 
where: 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(TAXADJ) = natural logarithm of tax audit adjustments divided by sales revenue. 
Explanatory variables: 
BT = pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by sales revenue. 
POST00 = 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise. 
Control variables: 
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise. 
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise. 
AGE = number of years since the initial public offering (IPO). 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects. 
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Table 6 Sensitivity Tests (Continued) 
Panel D2: Pooled Regression for the Main Sample Including Zero and Negative 
Tax Audit Adjustment (codes as 1) and Book Tax Difference Scaled by Total Assets 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient t-value p-value Tolerance VIF 
Explanatory Variables 
  BT ? -0.078 -1.678 0.093 0.146 6.841 
  POST00 ? 0.016 0.655 0.513 0.515 1.942 
  POST00*BT ? 0.220* 4.663 0.000 0.141 7.085 
Control Variables 
  OWNER ? 0.014 0.757 0.449 0.930 1.075 
  STRESS ? 0.090* 4.637 0.000 0.831 1.204 
  AGE ? -0.003 -0.131 0.896 0.582 1.718 
  SIZE ? -0.275* -14.298 0.000 0.846 1.182 
  INDUSTRY Not Reported 
N: 2799      Adjusted R-square: 0.124      F: 24.340      p-value: 0.000 
            * Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
TAXADJ=a0+a1BT+a2POST00+a3POST00*BT+a4OWNER+a5STRESS+a6AGE+a7SIZE+aiINDUSTRYi+ei 
where: 
Dependent variable: 
TAXADJ) = tax audit adjustments divided by total assets. 
Explanatory variables: 
BT = pre-tax accounting income minus taxable income and scaled by total assets. 
POST00 = 1, if tax audit adjustments are made for the fiscal years subsequent to 2000, zero otherwise. 
Control variables: 
OWNER = 1, if the book value of state shares is greater than that of institutional shares, zero otherwise. 
STRESS = 1, if the company issues new stocks in the next two years, zero otherwise. 
AGE = number of years since the initial public offering (IPO). 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
INDUSTRYi are dummy variables to control for firm fixed effects. 
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Appendix I 
Panel A: China’s Accounting Standards Issued by 2003 
Accounting Standard for 
Business Enterprises 
Promulgation 
Date 
Effective 
Date Revision Date 
Basic Standard Nov 30, 1992 July 1, 1993  
Disclosure of Related Party 
Relationships and Transactions May 22, 1997 Jan 1, 1997  
Cash Flow Statements March 20, 1998 Jan 1, 1998 Jan 18, 2001 
Events Occurring After the 
Balance Sheet Date May 12, 1998 Jan 1, 1998 April 14, 2003 
Debt Restructuring June 12, 1998 Jan 1, 1999 Jan 18, 2001 
Revenue June 20, 1998 Jan 1, 1999  
Investments June 24, 1998 Jan 1, 1999 Jan 18, 2001 
Construction Contracts June 25, 1998 Jan 1, 1999  
Changes in Accounting Policies 
And Accounting Estimates, and 
Corrections of Accounting 
Errors 
June 25, 1998 Jan 1, 1999 Jan 18, 2001 
Non-monetary Transactions June 28, 1999 Jan 1, 2000 Jan 18, 2001 
Contingencies April 27, 2000 July 1, 2000  
Intangible Assets Jan 18, 2001 Jan 1, 2001  
Borrowing Costs Jan 18, 2001 Jan 1, 2001  
Leases Jan 18, 2001 Jan 1, 2001  
Interim Financial Reporting Nov 2, 2001 Jan 1, 2002  
Inventories Nov 9, 2001 Jan 1, 2002  
Fixed Assets Nov 9, 2001 Jan 1, 2002  
Notes:  
(1) All the above standards are applicable to publicly traded companies in China. 
(2) The new effective dates of those revised standards are Jan 1, 2001, except the 
new effective date July 1, 2003 of Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date. 
 
 
Panel B: China’s Accounting Systems and Other Regulations Issued by 2003 
Title Promulgation Date Effective Date 
Accounting System for Listed Companies Jan 27, 1998 Jan 1, 1998 
Accounting System for Business Enterprises Dec 29, 2000 Jan 1, 2001 
Accounting System for Financial Institutions Nov 27, 2001 Jan 1, 2002 
Enterprises Financial Accounting 
Reporting Ordinance June 21, 2000 Jan 1, 2001 
Accounting Law of 
The People’s Republic of China Oct 31, 1999 July 1, 2000 
Notes: 
(a) All the above accounting rules are applicable to publicly traded companies in 
China. 
(b) Accounting System for Listed companies was abolished after Accounting System 
for Business Enterprises became effective on January 1, 2001. 
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Appendix II 
Significant Reforms of Accounting and Income Tax Rules in China 
Year Accounting Regulations Income Tax Regulations 
1991  
Income Tax Law for 
Foreign Investment Enterprises 
and Foreign Enterprises 
1992 Accounting Regulation for  Experimental Listed Companies  
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
– Basic Standards 
Enterprise Financial General Standards 1993 
Enterprise Financial and Accounting Systems 
 
1994  Enterprise Income Tax Law 
1995   
1996   
1997 
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
  - Disclosure of Related Party 
   Relationships and Transactions 
 
Accounting Systems for Listed Companies  
1998 Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
  - Cash Flow Statements 
  - Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet Date 
 
1999 
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
  - Debt Restructuring 
  - Revenue 
  - Investments 
  - Construction Contracts 
  - Changes in Accounting Policies And 
   Accounting Estimates, and 
   Corrections of Accounting Errors 
 
Accounting Law 
2000 Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
  - Non-monetary Transactions 
  - Contingencies 
Enterprise Income Tax Pretax 
Deduction Approaches 
Notes: All the above rules are classified into corresponding periods according to their 
effective dates of their latest editions. 
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Significant Reforms of Accounting and Income Tax Rules in China (Continued) 
Year Accounting Regulations Income Tax Regulations 
Accounting Systems for Business Enterprises 
Enterprises Financial 
Accounting Reporting Ordinance 
2001 
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
  - Cash Flow Statements (Revised) 
  - Debt Restructuring (Revised) 
  - Investments (Revised) 
  - Changes in Accounting Policies And 
   Accounting Estimates, and 
   Corrections of Accounting Errors (Revised) 
  - Non-monetary Transactions (Revised) 
  - Intangible Assets 
  - Borrowing Costs 
  - Leases 
Supplementary Documents 
(e.g., Circular on modification 
of pre-tax deduction standards 
of advertising expenses 
for certain industries; 
Circular on taxation on 
commission charges from 
checkoff of personal income 
tax on interest revenues 
of saving deposits) 
Accounting Systems for Financial Institutions 
2002 Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
  - Interim Financial Reporting 
  - Inventories 
  - Fixed Assets 
Supplementary Documents 
(e.g., Circular on corporate 
income tax of national debt 
interests after trial 
implementation of net-price 
trading of national debts; 
Circular on taxation policies 
Concerning re-employment of 
laid-off unemployed persons) 
2003 
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
  - Events Occurring After the Balance Sheet 
    Date (Revised) 
Supplementary Documents 
(e.g., Approaches of income 
tax treatments on debt 
restructuring transactions; 
Circular on income tax 
concerning the implementation 
of Accounting Standards 
for Business Enterprises) 
Notes: All the above rules are classified into corresponding periods according to their 
effective dates of their latest editions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65 
Appendix III 
Major Differential Items 
Between Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and Tax Rules 
Item Accounting Treatments Tax Treatments 
Category 1 
Sales-equivalent 
transactions 
Do not need to recognized as 
revenue. 
Recognized as 
revenue. 
Sales revenue from 
preliminary operation of 
construction in process 
Write down the costs of the 
construction project. 
The revenue should 
be charged into 
taxable income. 
Technology transfer 
revenue Recognized as revenue. 
Revenue less than 
RMB300,000 is 
exempted from 
taxation. 
Cash dividends or interest 
on current investments 
Write down the carrying value 
of investment upon receipt. 
Recognized as 
revenue. 
Long-term equity 
investments (equity 
method) 
Adjust the carrying amount of 
the investment according to its 
attributab1e share of the 
investee enterprise's net profit 
or loss, and recognize it as 
investment income for the 
current period accordingly. 
Investment loss 
should not be 
recognized if net loss 
of the investee 
enterprise occurs. 
Long-term debt 
investments 
Interest should be recognized 
as revenue periodically based 
on par value and interest rate. 
Interest revenue from 
national debts does 
not need to be 
charged into taxable 
income. 
Category 2 
Bad debt provision 
The method and amount of bad 
debt provision can be 
determined by the enterprises 
according to the specific 
situations. 
The amount of bad 
debt provision should 
not exceed 0.5% of 
the ending balance of 
accounts receivables 
Provision on impairment 
of inventories, current 
investments, long-term 
investments, fixed assets, 
construction in process, 
intangible assets, and 
consigned loans 
Charged into corresponding 
costs, expenses or losses 
accounts. 
The amount is not 
deductible from 
taxable income. 
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Major Differential Items 
Between Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and Tax Rules 
(Continued) 
Item Accounting Treatments Tax Treatments 
Category 2 (Continued) 
Depreciation of 
capital assets 
Depreciation methods, including 
straight-line method, units-of-
production method, double-
declining balance method, and 
sum-of-the-years-digits method, 
can be adopted. The expected 
useful life and estimated residual 
value can be determined based on 
the specific situation of the capital 
assets. 
In general, straight-line 
depreciation method should 
be used except special cases. 
The minimum useful life is 
stipulated for different 
categories of capital assets. 
Amortization of 
intangible assets 
If the relevant contract does not 
stipulate the beneficial period and 
the law does not stipulate the 
effective period, the amortization 
period should not exceed 10 years. 
The amortization period 
should not be less than 10 
years. 
Amortization of 
initial 
establishment 
expenditures 
Charged to the expenses for the 
period of the establishment of 
business. 
The amortization period 
should not be less than 5 
year since the 
commencement of the 
operation of business. 
Management 
fees to higher 
authorities 
Recognized as expenses. 
The upper limit of deductible 
amount is 2% of total 
revenue. 
Research and 
development 
expenses 
Recognized as expenses. 
If the research and 
development expenditures of 
the eligible enterprises 
increase by more than 10%, 
50% of the actual 
expenditures are deductible. 
Business 
entertainment 
expenses 
Recognized as overhead expenses. 
The upper limit of deductible 
amount is 5% of net sales 
revenue for the enterprises 
with net sales revenue less 
than RMB15 million, and 
3% for those with net sales 
revenue more than RMB15 
million. 
Salary expense Charged into corresponding accounts of costs and expenses. 
Salary expense cannot be 
deducted over a certain limit. 
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Major Differential Items 
Between Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and Tax Rules 
(Continued) 
Item Accounting Treatments Tax Treatments 
Category 3 
Advertising 
expenses 
Charged into operational 
expenses. 
In general, the advertising 
expenses in a fiscal year should 
not exceed 2% of sales 
revenue, or 8% for a certain 
industries. For some industries, 
the advertising expenses are 
not deductible. 
Business 
promotion 
expenses 
Charged into operational 
expenses. 
The business promotion 
expenses should not exceed 
0.5% of sales revenue. 
Commission fees Charged into operational expenses. 
The commission fees paid to 
individuals should not exceed 
5% of the total amount of 
service fees except some 
special cases. 
Category 4 
Expenses related to 
fund raising for the 
purpose of 
production and 
operation 
Charged into financial 
expenses. 
When the amount of loans 
obtained from the related 
parties exceeds 50% of 
registered capital, the interest 
expenses of the excess portion 
are not deductible. 
Borrowing costs 
Borrowing costs, except the 
costs incurred for the 
purpose of purchase and 
construction of fixed assets, 
should be charged into 
financial expenses for the 
current period. 
Borrowing costs for the 
purpose of investments should 
be recognized as costs of 
investments and are not 
deductible. 
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Major Differential Items 
Between Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises and Tax Rules 
(Continued) 
Item Accounting Treatments Tax Treatments 
Category 5 
Donation 
expenditures 
Charged into 
extraordinary expenses. 
Donation expenditures for public 
benefit and relief can be deductible 
with the upper limit of 3% of 
taxable income (1.5% for donations 
by financial institutions. Besides, 
the donation expenditures are 
deductible in some cases, and are 
not deductible in some other cases. 
Sponsoring 
expenditures 
Charged into 
extraordinary expenses. 
Non-advertising sponsoring 
expenditures are not deductible. 
Penalty 
expenditures 
Charged into 
extraordinary expenses. 
The following penalty expenditures 
are not deductible: 1) penalty of 
illegal operations and loss of 
confiscated properties; 2) overdue 
fines and other penalty 
expenditures related to taxation. 
Long-term equity 
investments 
acquired in 
exchange for non-
monetary assets 
The initial costs of 
investments should be 
determined according to 
the carrying value of the 
assets surrendered. 
Equivalent to sales of non-
monetary assets at the fair value 
and charged into taxable income. 
Debt settlement 
The differential amount 
from debt restructuring 
should be recognized as 
capital surplus or 
extraordinary loss. 
Debt payable should be charged 
into taxable income if debt can not 
be settled owing to debtee. 
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